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Abstract
We study a dynamic general equilibrium model in which firms choose their investment level
and their capital structure, trading oﬀ the tax advantages of debt against the risk of costly
default. The costs of bankruptcy are endogenously determined, as bankrupt firms are forced
to liquidate their assets, resulting in a fire sale if the market is illiquid. When the corporate
income tax rate is positive, firms have a unique optimal capital structure. In equilibrium
firms default with positive probability and their assets are liquidated at fire-sale prices.
The equilibrium not only features underinvestment but is also constrained ineﬃcient. In
particular there is too little debt and too little default.
JEL Nos: D5, D6, G32, G33
Keywords: Debt, equity, capital structure, default, market liquidity, constrained ineﬃ-
ciency, incomplete markets
1 Introduction
The financial crisis of 2007-2008 and the recent sovereign debt crisis in Europe have focused
attention on the macroeconomic consequences of debt financing. In this paper, we turn our
attention to the use of debt finance in the corporate sector and study the general equilibrium
eﬀects of debt finance on investment and growth. We show that, when markets are incomplete
and firms use debt and equity to finance investment, there is underinvestment and debt
finance is too low in equilibrium.
At the heart of our analysis is the determination of the firm’s capital structure. In
the classical model of Modigliani and Miller (1958), capital structure is indeterminate. To
obtain a determinate capital structure, subsequent authors appealed to market frictions, such
as distortionary taxes, bankruptcy costs, and agency costs.1 We follow this tradition and
examine an environment where the optimal capital structure balances the tax advantages
of debt against the risk of costly bankruptcy. More precisely, debt has an advantage over
equity because interest payments are deductible from corporate income, while dividends and
retained earnings are not. At the same time, the use of debt generates the risk of bankruptcy
which is costly for the firm because it forces the firm to sell its assets at fire-sale prices. The
firm balances the perceived costs and benefits of debt and equity in choosing its capital
structure. We show that these costs and benefits support an interior optimum of the firm’s
capital structure decision.
We consider an infinite-horizon economy, where firms choose their production and invest-
ment in long lived capital goods and are subject to productivity shocks. We focus primarily
on firms’ decisions and abstract from distributional issues by assuming there is a representa-
tive consumer. Firms finance the purchase of capital by issuing debt and equity. We assume
that markets are incomplete in two respects. First, there are no markets for contingent claims
allowing firms to insure against the risk of bankruptcy. Second, when a firm is bankrupt
1See, for example, Barnea, Haugen and Senbet (1981), Bradley, Jarrell and Kim (1984), Brennan and
Schwartz (1978), Dammon and Green (1987), Fischer, Heinkel and Zechner (1989), Kim (1982), Leland and
Toft (1996), Miller (1977), and Titman (1984) and Titman and Wessels (1988).
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- that is, fails to pay its debtors or to renegotiate its debt - the liquidation of its assets is
subject to a finance constraint that causes assets to be sold at fire-sale prices, i.e., at less
than their fundamental value.
In our model, both the corporate income tax and the cost of bankruptcy represent a pure
redistribution of resources rather than a real resource cost for the economy. The corporate
income tax revenue is returned to consumers in the form of lump sum transfers. Similarly,
the fire sale of assets constitutes a transfer of value to the shareholders of the firms that buy
the assets of bankrupt firms, rather than a deadweight cost. Since there is a representative
consumer, this “redistribution” has no eﬀect on welfare. Nonetheless, a rational, value-
maximizing manager of a competitive firm will perceive the tax as a cost of using equity
finance and the risk of a fire sale in bankruptcy as a cost of using debt. These perceived
costs determine the firm’s financing decisions, act like a tax on capital, and distort the firm’s
investment decision.
As a baseline, consider the case where the corporate income tax rate is zero. In that case,
the competitive equilibrium allocation is Pareto eﬃcient and the firms’ capital structure is
indeterminate.2 In other words, with a zero corporate income tax rate, the finance constraint
never binds and bankruptcy does not result in fire sales. By contrast, when the corporate
income tax rate is positive, competitive equilibria have quite diﬀerent properties. They are
not just Pareto ineﬃcient, exhibiting underinvestment; they are also constrained ineﬃcient.
Also, the optimal capital structure of firms is uniquely determined in equilibrium, each firm
uses positive amounts of risky debt and equity as sources of finance and faces a positive
probability of costly bankruptcy. So many features of the equilibrium change when the
corporate tax rate becomes positive because the tax interacts with the incompleteness of
markets and the finance constraint to generate endogenous costs of bankruptcy.
The intuition for the second property is simple. If the probability of bankruptcy were
2To be precise, for each individual firm any combination of debt and equity is optimal. There is however
a constraint on the aggregate amount of debt in the economy, which has to be small enough that fire sales
do not occur.
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zero or if bankrupt firms could be liquidated with no loss of value, then firms would use 100%
debt finance to avoid the corporate income tax. But, in equilibrium, we will show that 100%
debt finance is inconsistent with both a zero probability of bankruptcy and the absence of
fire sales, together with the optimality of firms’ decisions.
A similar argument shows that some debt has to be used in equilibrium. If firms used
100% equity finance, there would be no bankruptcy. Then a single firm could issue a small
amount of debt and benefit from the tax hedge, without causing a fire sale and hence without
the risk of costly bankruptcy. Uniqueness of the optimal capital structure follows from the
fact that a rational manager equates the marginal costs of debt and equity financing in equi-
librium and we show that, under reasonable conditions, the marginal costs are increasing.3
The constrained ineﬃciency of the equilibrium is the result of a pecuniary externality.
The tax on equity reduces the return on capital and causes underinvestment in equilibrium.
In equilibrium each firm sets its capital structure so that the benefit of a marginal increase
in its debt level, in terms of lower tax paid by the firm, just oﬀsets the increase in expected
bankruptcy costs.4 However, if all firms were to increase their use of debt, the liquidation
price of defaulting firms would drop, and hence the profits of any firm buying these assets
when solvent increase. This eﬀect oﬀsets the increase in expected costs when the firm is
bankrupt. As a result, an increase in the debt level of all firms would lower the tax paid and
increase the return on capital and hence also investment and welfare. The fact that each
firm is a price taker leads it to overestimate the costs of debt financing, whereas the planner
takes into account the change in prices when all firms increase the use of debt. This is the
source of the pecuniary externality. Note that this externality arises even in the presence of a
3We don’t wish to claim too much for this result, of course. The optimal capital structure is unique only
within a given (symmetric) equilibrium. In general, the capital structure depends on the equilibrium, which
in turn depends on the model parameters, including policy parameters such as the tax rate. But note that
the Modigliani-Miller theorem also holds for a given equilibrium of a given model.
4The cost of increasing the firm’s debt level has two components. First, the probability of going bankrupt
and having to liquidate assets in a fire sale increases. Second, the probability of making capital gains by
buying assets of other firms in a fire sale is reduced.
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representative consumer. Consumers collectively own all the assets, tax revenues are returned
to consumers, and firms end up holding the same assets after liquidation. Nonetheless, we
find that individual firms’ decisions are distorted and this imposes a welfare cost on the
economy.
We should point out that, as a result of this externality, in the environment considered
there is too little bankruptcy risk and too little debt financing in equilibrium. This appears
to contradict the common intuition that firms have an incentive to use too much debt. Our
analysis shows the importance of a careful evaluation of the costs of firms’ default and of the
reallocation of assets among them which takes place in this event, illustrating a novel eﬀect
of fire sales. The actual costs of default — and hence of debt relative to equity financing
— may prove to be lower than the costs privately perceived by firms, as firms also benefit
from this reallocation and the opportunity to acquire assets at low prices and these prices
are lower when the probability of default is higher. This misperception induces firms to rely
too little on debt compared to other sources of funding for which the risk of default is lower.
We believe this eﬀect is particularly relevant in markets where the firms purchasing assets
at fire-sale prices are the same firms running the risk of default.
1.1 Related literature
The classical literature on the firm’s investment decision excludes external finance constraints
and bankruptcy costs and uses adjustment costs to explain the reliance of investment on To-
bin’s  (see Eberly, Rebelo and Vincent, 2008, for a contemporary example). The new wave
literature on investment, exemplified by Sundaresan, Wang and Yang (2014) and Bolton,
Chen and Wang (2011), incorporates financing frictions of various types, such as a cost of
external funds, liquidity constraints and costs of liquidating the firm’s assets. Hackbarth
and Mauer (2012) then also allow for multiple debt issues with possibly diﬀerent seniority.
These papers study the investment and financing decisions of an individual firm in partial
equilibrium.
A few papers consider instead, like our work, dynamic general equilibrium models with
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several heterogeneous firms making optimal investment and financing decisions. Gomes and
Schmid (2010) and Miao and Wang (2010) study an environment fairly close to ours: they
also examine a representative agent economy where firms’ investment can be financed with
debt or equity, subject to a similar structure of costs. The liquidation cost, in the event
of default is exogenous in their set-up, whereas it is endogenously determined in ours by
the equilibrium price of liquidated assets. Also, they focus on the numerical analysis of an
equilibrium for a specification of the model aimed to match the persistence and volatility
of output growth, as well as credit spreads, while we provide a qualitative characterization
of equilibria and their welfare properties. The links between firms’ credit risk and their
leverage and investment decisions across the business cycle are examined by Kuehn and
Schmid (2011) in a partial equilibrium model with similar costs of financing.
The macroeconomic literature has emphasized the role of external finance constraints in
the business cycle. The financial accelerator model (Bernanke and Gertler, 1989; Bernanke,
Gilchrist and Gertler, 1999; Kiyotaki and Moore, 1997) shows that shocks to firm equity or
the value of collateral can restrict borrowing and amplify business cycle fluctuations. Our
focus is rather diﬀerent: we consider an environment where financial frictions take the form
of costs of debt or equity financing rather than borrowing constraints. We also emphasize the
factors that determine the firm’s choice of capital structure and the implications for welfare
and regulatory interventions.
Pecuniary externalities play a key role in our welfare analysis. It has been well known
since the mid-eighties that pecuniary externalities have an impact on welfare in the presence
of market incompleteness, information asymmetries, or other frictions (Arnott and Stiglitz,
1986; Greenwald and Stiglitz, 1986; Geanakoplos and Polemarchakis, 1986). It is interesting
to contrast our constrained ineﬃciency result to the ones obtained by Lorenzoni (2008) (see
also Bianchi, 2011, Korinek, 2012, Gersbach and Rochet, 2012) in a financial accelerator
model of the kind discussed in the previous paragraph, where firms’ borrowing is constrained
by the future value of their assets. These authors show that equilibria may display excessive
borrowing, since a reduction in borrowing and investment allows to reduce the misallocation
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costs of selling some of the firms’ assets in order to absorb negative shocks. In contrast we
show the ineﬃciency of the firms’ capital structure decisions in equilibrium in an environment
where firms are not constrained by the level of their collateral, but face some (endogenous)
costs of using alternative sources of funding. We find that an increase in the use of debt
relative to equity allows firms to lower their cost of funds, since the liquidation of the assets
of bankrupt firms at fire-sale prices constitutes not only a cost for a firm when bankrupt but
also a benefit for the same firm when solvent which firms fail to properly internalize.
The interaction between illiquidity and incompleteness of asset markets is also studied
in the literature on banking and financial crises. For models of fire sales and their impact
on bank portfolios, see Allen and Gale (2004a, 2004b). A similar process of renegotiation of
the debt of firms was considered by Gale and Gottardi (2011) in a static model in which, by
assumption, all investment was 100% debt financed.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we describe the primitives of
the model and characterize the first-best allocation. In Section 3 we describe the structure
of markets available specifying financial frictions and examine the decision problems of firms
and consumers. Section 4 defines competitive equilibria and establishes various fundamen-
tal properties. Section 5 shows that equilibria are ineﬃcient and exhibit underinvestment.
Moreover, it shows that they are also constrained ineﬃcient and the capital structure cho-
sen by firms exhibit too little debt. The concluding section discusses the robustness of the
results and extensions of the model. All proofs are collected in the appendix to this paper.
Extensions and additional results are contained in Appendix B, available online.
2 The Economy
We consider an infinite-horizon production economy. Time is described by a countable
sequence of dates,  = 0 1 . At each date there are two goods, a perishable consumption
good and a durable capital good.
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2.1 Consumers
There is a unit mass of identical, infinitely-lived consumers. The consumption stream of the
representative consumer is denoted by c = (0 1 ) ≥ 0, where  is the amount of the
consumption good consumed at date . For any c ≥ 0, the representative consumer’s utility
is denoted by  (c) and given by
 (c) =
∞X
=0
() (1)
where 0    1 and  : R+ → R has the usual properties: it is 2 and such that 0 ()  0
and 00 ()  0 for any  ≥ 0.
2.2 Production
There are two production sectors in the economy. In one, capital is produced using the
consumption good as an input. In the other, the consumption good is produced using the
capital good as an input.
Capital goods sector There is a unit mass of firms operating the technology for producing
capital. If  ≥ 0 is the amount of the consumption good used as an input at date , the
output is  () ≥ 0 units of capital at the end of the period, where  (·) is a 2 function
satisfying 0 ()  0 and 00 ()  0, for any  ≥ 0, as well as the Inada conditions,
lim→0 0 () =∞ and lim→∞ 0 () = 0.
Consumption goods sector The technology for producing the consumption good uses
capital as an input and exhibits constant returns to scale. Production in this sector is
undertaken by a continuum of firms subject to independent stochastic depreciation rates.
Each unit of capital good used as an input by firm  at an arbitrary date  produces
(instantaneously)   0 units of output and becomes  units after production takes place.
The random variables  are assumed to be i.i.d. across firms as well as over time with
mean ¯, support ∈ [0 1] and a continuous p.d.f. () We denote the c.d.f. by  () and
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the only other condition we impose on the distribution of  is that the hazard rate ()
1− () is
increasing.
2.3 Feasible allocations
At date 0, there is an initial stock of capital goods ¯0  0. To characterize the allocations
attainable in this economy the heterogeneity among firms and the idiosyncratic depreciation
shocks can be ignored since production can be diversified across the large number of firms.
By the law of large numbers convention, there is no aggregate uncertainty and the aggregate
depreciation rate is constant, with a fraction ¯ of the capital stock remaining each period
after depreciation. Thus a total amount of  ≥ 0 units of capital goods at date  produces
 units of consumption and leaves, after depreciation, ¯ units of capital goods to be used
next period.
A (symmetric) allocation is thus given by a sequence {  }∞=0 that specifies the
consumption , capital , and investment  at each date . The allocation {  }∞=0 is
feasible if, for every date  = 0 1 , it satisfies non-negativity,
(  ) ≥ 0 (2)
attainability for the consumption good,
 +  ≤  (3)
and the law of motion for capital,
+1 = ¯ +  ()  (4)
together with the initial condition 0 = ¯0.
It follows from the assumptions regarding the technology for producing the capital good
that there exists a unique level of the capital stock, 0  ˆ ∞, satisfying the condition

³
ˆ
´
=
¡
1− ¯¢ ˆ.
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When the capital stock at the beginning of a period is equal to ˆ, if all the current output
of the consumption good is used for investment the amount of capital available at the end of
the period remains constant, equal to ˆ. It is then straightforward to show that ˆ constitutes
an upper bound on the permanently feasible levels of the stock of capital.
Proposition 1 At any feasible allocation {  }∞=0, we have lim sup→∞  ≤ ˆ.
As a corollary, ˆ is an upper bound on the levels of consumption and investment that can
be maintained indefinitely:
lim sup
→∞
 ≤ ˆ lim sup→∞  ≤ ˆ
2.4 Eﬃcient allocations
A first-best, socially optimal allocation maximizes the utility of the representative consumer
within the set of feasible allocations. More precisely, it is a sequence {  }∞=0 that solves
the problem of maximizing the representative consumer’s utility (1) subject to the feasibility
constraints (2), (3), and (4).
To characterize the properties of the first best, consider the necessary and suﬃcient
conditions for an interior solution
¡     ¢ À 0  = 0 1  of this problem. For
some non-negative multipliers {( )}∞=0, the allocation
©¡     ¢ª∞=0 must satisfy
the conditions
0 ¡ ¢ = 
+1+ +1¯ = 
and
0
¡ ¢ = 
for every , together with the feasibility conditions (2-4) and the initial condition 0 = ¯0.
The boundedness property established above implies that the transversality condition
lim→∞
∞X
=
 () = 0
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is automatically satisfied.
Much of our analysis focuses on steady states, that is on allocations such that
(  ) = (  )
for all . It is interesting to see what the above first-order conditions imply for an optimal
steady state:
Proposition 2 At an optimal steady state, the capital stock is given by
 = 
¡¢
1− ¯  (5)
where ∗ is determined by

1− ¯ =
1
0 ()  (6)
Condition (6) has a natural interpretation in terms of marginal costs and benefits. The
marginal revenue of a unit of capital at the end of period 0 is

1− ¯ = + 
2¯+   + ¯−1+    
because it produces ¯−1 units of the consumption good at each date   0 and the present
value of that consumption is ¯−1. The marginal cost of a unit of capital is 10() units
of consumption at date 0. So the optimality condition (6) requires the equality of marginal
cost and marginal revenue.
3 An incomplete markets economy
In this section we specify the structure of markets available in this economy and study the
decision problems of individual firms and consumers.
3.1 Firms and Markets
In the capital goods sector, since production is instantaneous and no capital is used, firms
simply maximize current profits in each period.
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In the consumption sector, firms use capital, are infinitely lived and choose their in-
vestment level and financing strategy each period in the available markets. Firms are ex
ante identical, but subject to idiosyncratic depreciation shocks each period. Their ex post
heterogeneity cannot be ignored when we study their investment and financing decisions.
In a frictionless environment, where firms have access to a complete set of contingent
markets to borrow against their future income stream and hedge the idiosyncratic depreci-
ation shocks, the first-best allocation can be decentralized, in the usual way, as a perfectly
competitive equilibrium. In what follows, we consider instead an environment with financial
frictions, where there are no markets for contingent claims, firms are financed exclusively
with debt and equity and their output is sold in spot markets. In this environment as we
will see the first best is typically not attainable.
In the presence of uncertainty regarding the amount and value of a firm’s capital in the
subsequent period, debt financing gives rise to the risk of bankruptcy. This may be costly
because, in the event of default, a firm is required to liquidate its assets by selling them to
firms that remain solvent. These firms, though solvent, may be finance-constrained. When
this happens, there will be a fire sale, in which assets are sold for less than their full economic
value.
Equity financing, by contrast, entails no bankruptcy risk. The disadvantage of equity
is that firms must pay a (distortionary) tax on equity’s returns. We assume for simplicity
that the revenue of the tax on equity is used to make an equal lump sum transfer to all
consumers.
Both sources of funding, debt and equity, entail some costs for firms in the consump-
tion good sector. Firms choose their optimal capital structure in each period, that is, the
composition of outstanding debt and equity, by trading oﬀ the relative costs and benefits.
Given the CRTS property of the technology, the size of individual firms and the mass of
firms active in the consumption good sector are indeterminate. Moreover, since there will
be bankruptcy of existing firms and we allow for entry of new firms, the mass of active firms
may change over time. To simplify the description of equilibrium, we will focus our attention
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on the case where a combination of entry and exit maintains the mass of firms equal to unity
and firms adjust their size so that each has the same amount of capital. Given the inherent
indeterminacy of equilibrium in the consumption goods sector, this assumption entails no
essential loss of generality and allows us to describe the evolution of the economy in terms
of a representative firm with capital stock .
At the initial date  = 0, we assume that all capital is owned by firms in the consumption
good sector and that each of these firms has been previously financed entirely by equity.
Each consumer has an equal shareholding in each firm in the two sectors.
In what follows we shall focus our attention on the case where all firms’ debt has a
maturity of one period, so that the entire debt is due for repayment one period after it is
issued. Alternatively, we could have assumed that debt has a maturity of  periods. In that
case the repayment due each period would be smaller. However, debt with longer maturity
also creates a moral hazard problem for creditors, because creditors have little power over
a firm as long as it pays in any period the required interest and principal. Hence equity
holders could enrich themselves at the expense of bond holders, paying themselves large
dividends by selling oﬀ capital until the firm is worthless. To address this problem long-term
bond contracts typically contain multiple covenants controlling the behavior of the firm. For
instance, covenants might restrict the firm’s ability to issue new debt, require the firm to
maintain an adequate ratio of earnings to interest payments, the so-called interest coverage
ratio, or to maintain the value of its assets in relation to the value of debt. If any of those
covenants is violated, the firm is technically in default and the repayment of the entire debt
is due immediately, which forces a renegotiation of the debt, similarly to the case of one
period bonds. In Appendix B, we show how the model can be extended to the special case of
perpetual bonds, where covenants give rise to default precisely as it occurs with one-period
bonds.
To analyze the firms’ decision formally we must first describe in more detail the structure
of markets and the timing of the debt renegotiation process leading possibly to default and
liquidation.
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3.2 Renegotiation and default
Each date  is divided into three sub-periods, labeled , , and .
A. In the first sub-period (), the production of the consumption good occurs and the
depreciation shock of each firm , , is realized. Also, the debt liabilities of each
firm are due. The firm has three options: it can repay the debt, renegotiate (“roll
over”) the debt, or default and declare bankruptcy. Renegotiation is modeled by a
game described in the next section. If renegotiation succeeds the firm remains solvent
and may then distribute its earnings to equity holders or retain them to finance new
purchases of capital.
B. In the intermediate sub-period (), the market opens where bankrupt firms can sell
their assets (their capital). A liquidity constraint applies, so that only agents with
ready cash, either solvent firms who retained earnings in sub-period  or consumers
who received dividends in sub—period , can purchase the assets on sale. Let  denote
the market price of the liquidated capital.
C. In the final sub-period (), the production of capital goods occurs. The profits of the
firms who operate in this sector are distributed to the consumers who own them. In
addition, debt holders of defaulting firms receive the proceeds of the liquidation sales in
sub-period B. The taxes on equity’s returns are due and the lump sum transfers to con-
sumers are also made in this sub-period. All other markets open, spot markets, where
the consumption and capital goods are traded, at the prices 1 and , respectively, as
well as asset markets, where debt and equity issued by firms (both surviving and newly
formed) to acquire capital are traded. The consumers buy and sell these securities in
order to fund future consumption and rebalance their portfolios. Equilibrium requires
that  ≤ ; if    no firm buys capital at the price  and capital goods are in
excess supply in sub-period , contradicting the equilibrium conditions.
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Note that agents face no liquidity constraint in the markets in sub-period . We can
interpret the fact that this constraint only applies to the markets for liquidated assets in
sub-period  as portraying the haste with which the firms’ assets need to be sold after a
default. It can also be taken as an institutional feature of the bankruptcy process that does
not apply to other markets.
Bankruptcy procedures are source of numerous possible frictions (see Bebchuk, 1988;
Aghion, Hart and Moore, 1992; Shleifer and Vishny, 1992). In the present model, we focus
on one potential source of market failure, the so-called finance constraint, which requires
buyers to pay for their purchases of assets with the funds (cash) available to them, not with
the issue of IOUs. Hence the potential buyer who values the assets most highly may not
be able to raise enough finance to purchase the assets at their full economic value. This is
the cost of bankruptcy in the environment considered, which is endogenously determined in
equilibrium.5
We believe that our model of capital markets, with a clear distinction between liquidation
markets, represented by sub-period  where only cash is accepted, and normal markets,
represented by sub-period  where firms have complete access to external finance and there
is no liquidity constraint, is a reasonable approximation of reality. It is generally accepted
that capital markets are not perfect and it is costly, also in terms of time, for firms to obtain
external finance. A firm with suﬃcient time available may find it feasible to raise finance
for new capital goods by issuing debt and/or equity. In contrast, when a distressed firm
sells assets in a fire sale, firms in the same industry don’t have the time to obtain external
finance and have to rely on retained earnings to purchase these assets.6 The distinction
between markets for liquidated assets, where assets have to sold in a hurry, and normal
asset markets is obviously a matter of degree. Here, we have made the distinction sharper
than it is in reality by assuming the market for liquidated capital goods is “cash only,”
while firms in the other market have “free” access to external finance. This makes the model
5As further discussed in Section 5.2, we could allow for an additional, deadweight cost of bankruptcy,
with no substantial change in the results.
6A model of this process is found in Shleifer and Vishny (1992).
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tractable, without distorting reality too much, but the distinction could be weakened without
substantial qualitative change.
3.2.1 Sub-period A: The renegotiation game
Consider a firm with  units of capital and an outstanding debt with face value 7 at
the beginning of period . The firm produces  units of the consumption good, learns the
realization of its depreciation shock  and must then choose whether to repay the debt or
try to renegotiate it. The renegotiation process that occurs in sub-period  between the
firm and the creditors who purchased the firm’s bonds at − 1 is represented by a two-stage
game.
S1 The firm makes a “take it or leave it” oﬀer to the bond holders to rollover the debt,
replacing each unit of the maturing debt with face value  with a combination of
equity and debt maturing the following period. The new face value of the debt, +1,
determines the firm’s capital structure since equity is just a claim to the residual value.
S2 The creditors simultaneously accept or reject the firm’s oﬀer.
Two conditions must be satisfied in order for renegotiation to succeed. First, a majority
of the creditors must accept the oﬀer. Second, the rest of the creditors must be paid oﬀ
in full. If either condition is not satisfied, the renegotiation fails and the firm is declared
bankrupt. In that event, all the assets of the firm are frozen, nothing is distributed until
the capital stock has been liquidated (sold in the market). After liquidation, the sale price
of the liquidated assets is distributed to the bond holders in sub-period . Obviously, there
is nothing left for the shareholders in this case. Hence default is always involuntary: a firm
acting so as to maximize its market value will always repay or roll over the debt unless it is
unable to do so.
7Here and in what follows, it is convenient to denote by  the face value of the debt issued per unit of
capital acquired.
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We show next that there is an equilibrium of this renegotiation game where renegotiation
succeeds if and only if
 ≤ (+ )  (7)
that is, if the value of the firm’s equity is negative when its capital is evaluated at its
liquidation price . Note that the condition is independent of .
Consider, with no loss of generality, the case of a firm with one unit of capital, i.e.,  = 1,
and take an individual creditor holding debt with face value . If he rejects the oﬀer and
demands to be repaid immediately, he receives  in sub-period . With this payment, since
we said  ≤ , we can assume without loss of generality that he purchases  units of capital
in sub-period . Similarly, if the firm manages to roll over its debt, we can assume it retains
its cashflow  and purchases  units of capital in sub-period . Then it will have  + 
units of capital at the start of sub-period . Therefore the most that the firm can oﬀer the
creditor is a claim to an amount of capital  +  at the beginning of sub-period , with
market value 
³

 + 
´
. The firm’s oﬀer will be accepted only if the creditor rejecting the
oﬀer ends up with no more capital than by accepting. Hence the firm is only able to make
an oﬀer that is accepted if

 ≤

 + 
which is equivalent to (7).
If (7) is satisfied, there exists a sub-game perfect equilibrium of the renegotiation game
in which the firm makes an acceptable oﬀer worth  units of capital at the end of the
period to the creditors and all of them accept. To see this, note first that the shareholders
receive a non-negative payoﬀ from rolling over the debt, whereas they get nothing in the
event of default. Second, the creditors will accept the oﬀer of  because they cannot get
a higher payoﬀ by deviating and rejecting it, and they will not accept a lower oﬀer. Thus,
we have the following simple result.
Proposition 3 There exists a sub-game perfect equilibrium of the renegotiation game in
which the debt is renegotiated if and only if (7) is satisfied.
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Proposition 3 leaves open the possibility that renegotiation may fail even if (7) is satisfied.
Indeed it is the case that if every other creditor rejects the oﬀer, it is optimal for a creditor
to reject the oﬀer because a single vote has no eﬀect. In the sequel, we ignore this trivial
coordination failure among lenders and assume that renegotiation succeeds whenever (7) is
satisfied, to explore other, less trivial, sources of ineﬃciency.
3.2.2 Sub-period B: Liquidation
Let  denote the break even value of , implicitly defined by the following equation
 ≡ +  (8)
Thus renegotiation fails and a firm is bankrupt if and only if   . When all firms active
at the beginning of date  have the same size (), the supply of capital to be liquidated by
bankrupt firms in sub-period  is Z 
0
 () 
The maximal amount of resources available to purchase capital in sub-period  is then given
by the total earnings of solvent firms (with  ≥ )

Z 1

 ()  =  (1−  ()) 
If    a manager operating a solvent firm in the interest of its shareholders will retain
all its earnings to have them available to purchase capital in sub-period  This choice
maximizes the firm’s market value and shareholders can always sell their shares to finance
consumption. On the other hand if  =  solvent firms are indiﬀerent between retaining
their earnings or distributing them as dividends. Hence market clearing in the liquidation
market requires

Z 
0
 ()  ≤  (1−  ())  (9)
with (9) holding with equality if   , in which case all the available resources must be
oﬀered in exchange for liquidated capital.
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3.2.3 Sub-period C: Settlement, investment and trades
Capital sector decisions The decision of the firms operating in the capital goods sector,
in sub-period , is simple. At any date , the representative firm chooses  ≥ 0 to maximize
current profits,  ()−. Because of the concavity of the production function, a necessary
and suﬃcient condition for the investment level  to be optimal is
0 () ≤ 1 (10)
with strict equality if   0. The profits from the capital sector,  = sup≥0 { ()− },
are then paid to consumers in the same sub-period.
Consumption sector decisions In the consumption goods sector, the firms’ decision
is more complicated because the production of consumption goods requires capital, which
generates returns that repay the investment over time. So the firm needs funds, issuing debt
and equity to finance the purchase of capital.
As we explained above, the number and size of firms in this sector are indeterminate
because of constant returns to scale. We consider a symmetric equilibrium in which, at any
date, a unit mass of firms are active and all of them have the same size, given by  units
of capital8 at the end of date . The representative firm chooses its capital structure to
maximize its market value, that is, the value of the outstanding debt and the equity claims
on the firm. This capital structure is summarized by the break even point +1. Whenever
the firm’s depreciation shock next period is +1  +1, the firm defaults and its value (again
per unit of capital held at the end of date ) is equal to the value of the firm’s liquidated
assets, ++1+1. If +1  +1, the firm is solvent and can use its earnings  to purchase
capital at the price +1. Then the pretax value of the firm is +1
³

+1 + +1
´
.
8Because a fraction of firms default each period, the surviving firms who acquire their capital may grow
in size in sub-period , but are then indiﬀerent between buying or selling capital at  in sub-period 
Hence we can always consider a situation where the mass of active firms remains unchanged over time, while
their size varies with 
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With regard to the corporate tax, the accounting treatment of depreciation in the presence
of fire sales poses some problems in calculating corporate income. For simplicity, we assume
that the tax base is the value of the firm’s equity at the beginning of sub-period , whenever
it is non negative. The tax rate is then denoted by   0. This tax has the same qualitative
properties as the corporate income tax, in the sense that is a tax on capital goods and gives
preferred treatment to interest on debt.9
To calculate the value of equity, we need to subtract from the value of capital owned by
the firm, +1
³

+1 + +1
´
, the value of the (renegotiated) debt, +1
³+1
+1
´
. The tax base
is
+1
µ 
+1 + +1
¶
− +1
µ+1
+1
¶
 (11)
and the tax payment due at date + 1 in sub-period  is
 max
½
+1
µ 
+1 + +1
¶
− +1
µ+1
+1
¶
 0
¾
=  max
½+1
+1 (+ +1+1 − +1)  0
¾

Because there is no aggregate uncertainty and there is a continuum of firms oﬀering debt
and equity subject to idiosyncratic shocks, diversified debt and equity are risk-free and must
bear the same rate of return. Denoting by  the risk-free interest rate between date  and
+ 1, the value of the firm at  is given by the expected value of the firm at date + 1Z +1
0
(+ +1+1)  +
Z 1
+1
∙
+1
µ 
+1 + +1
¶
−  +1+1 (+ +1+1 − +1)
¸

(12)
divided by 1+ . Hence the firm’s problem consists in the choice of its capital structure, as
summarized by +1, so as to maximize the following objective function
1
1 + 
½Z +1
0
(+ +1+1)  +
Z 1
+1
∙
+1
µ 
+1 + +1
¶
− +1 (+1 − +1)
¸

¾
(13)
9In Appendix B we also show formally the equivalence between a proportional tax on corporate earnings
and a proportional tax on the value of equity in a slightly simpler specification of the environment, where
depreciation is non stochastic.
19
where we used (8) to substitute for +1 in (12). The solution of the firm’s problem has a
fairly simple characterization:
Proposition 4 When10 +1  +1 there is a unique solution  for the firm’s optimal
capital structure, given by +1 = 0 when
³
1− +1+1
´
 (0) ≥  and by 0    1 satisfyingµ
1
+1 −
1
+1
¶
(+ +1+1)  (+1)
1−  (+1) = 
when
³
1− +1+1
´
 (0)   .
The value of the firm (per unit of capital) at a solution of (13) is then equal to the market
value of capital, .
The consumption savings decision The representative consumer has an income flow
generated by his initial ownership of shares of firms in the two sectors, equal to the date 0
value of firms with capital 0 in the consumption good sector plus the payment each period of
the profits  of firms in the capital good sector. In addition, he receives lump sum transfers
 from the government at every date. Since he faces no income risk and can fully diversify
the idiosyncratic income risk of equity and corporate debt, the consumer eﬀectively trades a
riskless asset each period. His choice problem reduces to the maximization of the discounted
stream of utility subject to the lifetime budget constraint:
max
P∞
=0  ()
s.t. 0 +P∞=1  = 0 + 0¯0 + 0 +P∞=1  ( + )  (14)
where  =Q−1=0 11+ is the discount rate between date 0 and date t, given the access to risk
free borrowing and lending each period at the rate .11
10When +1 = +1 the solution is clearly full debt financing, +1 = 1
11The (average) value of firms owning the initial endowment of capital 0 equals the value of the output
0 produced with this capital in sub-period  plus the value of the capital left after depreciation in sub-
period , ¯00. Since they are, as we said, financed entirely with equity, this coincides with their equity
value. Also, while producers of capital good operate and hence distribute profits in every period  ≥ 0 the
first equity issue is at the end of date 0 and hence the first tax revenue on equity earnings is at date  = 1
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Market clearing The market-clearing condition for the consumption good is
 +  =  for all  ≥ 0 (15)
The markets for debt and equity clear, at any , if the amount of households’ savings is equal
to the value of debt and equity issued by firms in that period. We show in the appendix
that the market-clearing condition for the securities markets is automatically satisfied if the
market-clearing condition for the consumption good market (15) is satisfied. This is just an
application of Walras’ law.
Finally, the market for capital clears if
+1 = ¯ +  () (16)
4 Equilibrium
We are now ready to state the equations defining a competitive equilibrium in the environ-
ment described.
Definition 5 A competitive equilibrium is a sequence of values
©¡∗  ∗  ∗+1 ∗  ∗+1 ∗  ∗ ¢ª∞=0
satisfying the following conditions:
1. Profit maximization in the capital goods sector. For every date  ≥ 0, ∗
solves (10).
2. Optimal capital structure. For every date  ≥ 0, the capital structure ∗+1 of the
firms in the consumption goods sector satisfies:µ
1
∗+1 −
1
∗+1
¶¡+ ∗+1∗+1¢  ¡∗+1¢1−  ¡∗+1¢ =  
and the value of firms in this sector satisfies the law of motion
(1 + ∗ ) ∗ =
½Z ∗+1
0
¡+ ∗+1+1¢  +Z 1
∗+1
µ
∗+1
µ 
∗+1 + +1
¶
− ∗+1 (+1 − +1)
¶

)
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3. Optimal consumption. The sequence {∗}∞=0 satisfies the following first-order condi-
tions
0 ¡∗+1¢
0(∗ ) =
1
1 + ∗ 
for every date  ≥ 0, together with the budget constraint
∗0 +
∞X
=1
Ã−1Y
=0
1
1 + ∗
!
∗ = 0 + ∗0 ¯0 + ∗0(∗0 )− ∗0+
∞X
=1
Ã−1Y
=0
1
1 + ∗
!Ã
∗ ∗
Z 1
∗
( − ∗ )  ()  + ∗ (∗ )− ∗
!
4. Liquidation market clearing. For every date   0, ∗ ≤ ∗ and (9) holds.
5. Consumption Goods market clearing. For every date  ≥ 0, (15) holds.
6. Capital market clearing. For every date  ≥ 0, the sequence {∗ } satisfies (16) and
∗0 = ¯0.
The equilibriummarket prices of equity ∗ and debt ∗ at any date  are readily obtained
from the other equilibrium variables.12
Condition 1 requires firms in the capital goods sector to maximize profits at every date,
taking the price of capital goods ∗ as given. Condition 2 requires firms in the consumption
goods sector to choose their capital structures optimally. The law of motion for the value
of the firm is simply the Bellman equation associated with the maximization problem in
equation (13). Condition 3 requires that the consumption path solves the consumers’ maxi-
mization problem (14). Conditions 4 — 6 are the market-clearing conditions for the liquidated
capital goods in sub-period  and for consumption goods and capital goods in sub-period
.
Putting together the market-clearing condition (9) for liquidated capital in sub-period 
with the optimality conditions for the firms in the consumption good sector (Proposition 4),
12As explained above, the returns on diversified equity and debt are deterministic. Thus, ∗ and ∗ must
be such that the one-period expected returns on debt and equity are equal to the risk free rate.
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we see that in equilibrium we must have an interior optimum for the firms’ capital structure:
 ∈ (0 1), and   .13 Thus, default is costly and occurs with probability strictly between
zero and one:
0   ()  1
Intuitively, if default were costless ( = ) firms would choose 100% debt financing, but this
implies default with probability one, which is inconsistent with market clearing. Similarly,
100% equity financing implies that there is no default and hence default is costless, so firms
should use 100% debt financing instead. The only remaining alternative is a mixture of debt
and equity and costly default.
We also see from the previous analysis that uncertainty only aﬀects the returns and
default decisions of individual firms. All other equilibrium variables, aggregate consumption,
investment, and market prices are deterministic.
4.1 Steady-state equilibria
A steady state is a competitive equilibrium {(∗  ∗  ∗  ∗  ∗  ∗  ∗ )}∞=0 in which for all  ≥ 0
(∗  ∗  ∗  ∗  ∗  ∗  ∗ ) = (∗ ∗ ∗ ∗ ∗ ∗ ∗) 
We show first that a steady state exists and is unique. In addition, the system of condi-
tions defining a steady state can be reduced to a system of two equations.
Proposition 6 Under the maintained assumptions, there exists a unique steady-state equi-
librium, obtained as a solution of the following system of equations:
∗ = (1−  (
∗))R ∗
0
()  (17)
∗ = 
1− ¯ +  R 1∗( − ∗)  1− ¯  (18)µ
1
∗ −
1
∗
¶
(+ ∗∗)  (
∗)
1−  (∗) =   (19)
13Condition 2 above is in fact stated for this case.
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We can then also identify some of the comparative statics properties of the steady state.
Proposition 7 (i) An increase in the tax rate  increases the steady value of ∗ (and hence
the debt-equity ratio) and reduces the one of ∗, but the eﬀect on ∗ (and hence ∗ and ∗)
is ambiguous.
(ii) An increase in the discount factor  decreases the steady-state value of ∗ (and hence the
debt-equity ratio) and increases the one of ∗ as well of ∗, so that ∗ and ∗ increase too.
To get some intuition for these results, consider in particular the case of an increase in
the tax rate  . This increases the cost of equity financing, so that firms shift to higher debt
financing, thus decreasing the liquidity available in sub-period B and hence the liquidation
value of defaulting firms. While the direct eﬀect of the higher tax rate, by making equity
financing costlier, is clearly to decrease , the fact that the higher tax increases debt financing
() has an opposite eﬀect on , increasing it as we see from (18), hence the ambiguity of the
overall eﬀect on .
4.2 Transition dynamics
The steady state is often studied because of its simplicity, but non-steady-state paths may
have very diﬀerent properties. For this particular model, however, the steady state is repre-
sentative of equilibrium paths in general, at least if one is willing to assume a linear utility
function.14 In that case, we can show that, in any equilibrium, there is a constant equilib-
rium capital structure which coincides with the steady state capital structure; the same is
then true for   and . Thus, outside the steady state, the only variable that is changing
is the capital stock, which converges monotonically to the steady-state value. In this sense,
little is lost by focusing on the steady state. The analysis of transition dynamics is relegated
for completeness to Appendix B.
14Since there is no aggregate uncertainty, risk aversion is not an issue. The only role played by the
curvature of the utility function is to determine the intertemporal marginal rate of substitution (IMRS).
By assuming that the utility function is linear, one imposes a constant IMRS. This restricts somewhat the
adjustment of endogenous variables along the transition path, but is otherwise innocuous.
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5 Welfare analysis
5.1 The ineﬃciency of equilibrium
If we compare the conditions for a Pareto eﬃcient steady state derived in Proposition 2 with
the conditions for a steady-state equilibrium derived in Section 4.1, we find that steady-state
equilibria are Pareto eﬃcient if ∗ = , which happens when the equilibrium market value
of capital is given by
∗ = 
1− ¯
From the equilibrium conditions, in particular Condition 2, it can be seen immediately that
the equality above can hold only if  = 0. In that case, there is no cost of issuing equity and
the firms in the consumption goods sector will choose 100% equity finance. On the other
hand, when   0, as we have been assuming, the equilibrium market value of capital ∗ is
strictly lower than 
1−¯ and ∗ and ∗ are strictly less than the corresponding values at the
first best steady state. Thus, in a steady state equilibrium, the financial frictions given by
market incompleteness and the costs of default and equity financing as perceived by firms
imply that firms invest a lower amount and the equilibrium stock of capital is lower than at
the eﬃcient steady state. Hence even with a representative consumer, competitive equilibria
are Pareto ineﬃcient15.
Short of getting rid of the corporate income tax, a policy of reducing the tax rate across
the board would also improve welfare. As we saw in the comparative statics exercise, a
reduction in the tax rate will increase the value of the firm (capital goods), causing an
increase in investment and consumption. Similarly, policies such as accelerated depreciation,
expensing of investments in research and development, or subsidies on investment, which
have the eﬀect of reducing the eﬀective tax rate will also increase welfare.
15When the initial capital stock 0 =  the unique Pareto eﬃcient allocation of the economy is the
Pareto eﬃcient steady state. Since as we saw the equilibrium allocation is diﬀerent, it is clearly Pareto
ineﬃcient. For other values of 0 the transitional dynamics of the Pareto eﬃcient allocation needs also to
be considered to claim the ineﬃciency of the equilibrium. This can be shown formally by proceeding along
similar lines to the ones of the next section.
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In our simplified model, all firms are ex ante identical, so the most eﬀective policy is a
uniform reduction of the tax rate. If firms are heterogeneous, however, it might be advan-
tageous to target firms that are vulnerable to fire sales, either because they are riskier or
because they have less liquid markets for liquidated capital goods. In that case, a uniform
tax rate on corporate income, combined with incentives for particular industries, might be
called for.
5.2 Constrained ineﬃciency
It is not surprising that the equilibrium is Pareto-ineﬃcient in the presence of financial
frictions aﬀecting firms’ financing. To assess the scope of policy and regulatory interventions,
however, it is more interesting and appropriate to see whether a welfare improvement can
be found, taking as given the presence of such frictions (market incompleteness, liquidity
constraints and distortionary taxation). More precisely, we examine whether regulating the
levels of a single endogenous variable, in particular, the capital structure as represented
by , can lead to a welfare improvement while allowing all other variables to reach their
equilibrium levels. If so, we say that competitive equilibria are constrained ineﬃcient.
Suppose the economy is in a steady state equilibrium and consider an intervention con-
sisting in a permanent16 change ∆ starting at some fixed but arbitrary date  + 1. Thus
from this date onwards  is constant and equal to ∗+∆ To determine the welfare eﬀects
of this intervention we need to trace the changes in equilibrium prices, investment and con-
sumption over time and hence the transition to the new steady state. To make this analysis
more transparent, we assume consumers are risk neutral17, that is,  () = .
The induced changes in the equilibrium variables  and  are then obtained by substi-
tuting the new value of  into the market-clearing condition in sub-period , (9),
 (1−  (∗ +∆)) = +1+
Z ∗+∆
0
 (20)
16We focus attention on a permanent intervention, but it is fairly easy to verify that the same welfare
result holds in the case of a temporary intervention.
17See footnote 14 for a discussion of this specification of consumers’ preferences.
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and the law of motion of , appearing in Condition 2 of the definition of a competitive
equilibrium,18
+ = 
½
+ +1+¯ − +1+
Z 1
∗+∆
( − ∗ −∆)
¾
 (21)
for all  ≥ 019 We see from (20) that the new equilibrium value for + is the same for all 
and from (21) we obtain a first-order diﬀerence equation in . The solution of this equation
diverges monotonically since the coeﬃcient on +1+ has absolute value¯¯¯¯
¯ − 
Z 1
∗+∆
( − ∗ −∆)
¯¯¯¯
 max
½
¯ 
Z 1
∗+∆
( − ∗ −∆)
¾
≤ max©¯  ¯ª = ¯  1
Hence, the only admissible solution is obtained by setting + equal to its new steady-state
value:
+ = +1+ = ∗ +∆ = 
1− ¯ +  R 1∗+∆( − ∗ −∆)  (22)
The new equilibrium investment level is then determined by the optimality condition for
the capital goods producers, (10),
+0 (+) = 1 (23)
Since, by the previous argument, + is equal to its new steady-state equilibrium value,
∗+∆, we have + = ∗+∆ for all  ≥ 0, where the sign of ∆ equals the sign of ∆ By
substituting this value into the capital market clearing condition, (16) we obtain that the
law of motion of the capital stock is now
++1 = ¯+ +  (∗ +∆)
for all  ≥ 0, with  = ∗
18We used here (9) and the property 1 + + = 1 following from the specification of consumers’
preferences, to simplify the expression.
19Note that expressions (20) and (21) give us the new equilibrium levels of  and  also for any discrete
change ∆, as long as we have  ≥ , that is as long as  +∆ is not too close to 0
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The dynamics of agents’ consumption is given by the following equations:
+ = + − (∗ +∆) , for all  ≥ 0
By substituting the values of  obtained from the law of motion of capital, we find that the
change in consumption for a (marginal) change in  (and hence in  and ) is given by
∆ = −∆
∆+ =
(
−1 +1− ¯

1− ¯ 
0 (∗)
)
∆ ∀ ≥ 1
and hence the eﬀect on agents’ welfare is
∞X
=0
∆+ =
(
1
1− 
µ
−1 + 
1− ¯
0 (∗)
¶
−
∞X
=1
¡¯¢ 1
1− ¯
0 (∗)
)
∆
=
½
− 1
1−  +
µ
 1
1− ¯
0 (∗)
¶µ 
1−  −
¯
1− ¯
¶¾
∆
The term in brackets in this expression is strictly positive because, as we showed in the
previous section, in a steady-state equilibrium we always have
 
1− ¯ 
1
0(∗) = 
∗
Hence, consumers’ welfare increases if and only if ∆  0.
From (22) it is then easy to verify that sign ∆ = sign ∆, since

∗
Z 1
∗
( − ∗) = −
Z 1
∗
  0
From (23) we obtain then

 =



 =


µ
− 
0
00
¶
 0
This establishes the following:
Proposition 8 The steady state competitive equilibrium is constrained ineﬃcient: a perma-
nent increase in  above its equilibrium value is welfare improving.
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The intervention is specified in terms of the threshold  below which the firm has to
default on its debt. It can be easily verified that a marginal increase of this threshold above
∗ corresponds to an increase in the firms’ debt-equity ratio. The ratio between the market
value of the firm’s debt and that of its equity is in fact given by20
+
+ =
R 
0
(+ +1+)  + R 1 +1+ ³ +1+ + ´ R 1
 +1+( − ) (1− ) 
(24)
The denominator is clearly decreasing in . Since + + + = + and ∗ maximizes the
firms’ market value + the numerator must increase with , and so ++.
Proposition 8 establishes the optimality of a marginal increase in  Consider then a
sequence of discrete changes ∆, such that  + ∆ approaches 1. Along such a sequence,
 goes to zero21 and we also see from (22) that  approaches 
1−¯ and hence, by (6), 
approaches . That is, in the limit, the equilibrium corresponding to such an intervention
converges to the steady-state, first-best allocation.22 We can then say that the constrained
optimal capital structure of firms exhibit maximal leverage.
To get some understanding of the determinants of the above result, note first that, when
firms increase their leverage, that is,  is increased above ∗, the tax paid on each unit of
capital,  R 1 (−) , decreases. At the same time, as we can see from the expression of the
firms’ market value in (13), firms face a higher probability and hence a higher expected cost
of default, given by the diﬀerence between the liquidated value of the firm’s assets, , and
the normal market value, . At a competitive equilibrium, firms do not want to deviate from
∗ as the benefits and costs of a marginal increase in leverage oﬀset each other. The cost of
default depends, however, on prices and, when all firms change their leverage choices, prices
20The term on the denominator, is obtained from the expression of the pre-tax value of the equity of the
firm, when solvent, obtained in (11). This is then subtracted from the overall value of the firm, in (13), to
obtain the value of debt.
21Note that the equilibrium condition (20) has an admissible solution for all  +∆  1, but not in the
limit for  +∆ = 1
22In contrast, we see from (12), that when firms act as price takers their optimal decision when  → 0 is
 ∼ 0
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change. Once we substitute for  its equilibrium value from the market-clearing condition
(9), as we did in (22), we find that the higher losses incurred by a firm when bankrupt are
perfectly oﬀset by the higher gains made when solvent (when the firm is able to buy capital
at cheaper prices). As a consequence, the net eﬀect of an increase in  by all firms, when we
take the change in prices into account, is just the decrease in the cost of the tax paid, and the
firms’ value  increases. Thus, once the pecuniary externality is internalized, the cost of debt
financing turns out to be lower than the cost perceived by firms. Hence, a higher leverage
induces a higher level of . This in turn increases the firms’ investment, which raises the
capital stock in the economy. Since the equilibrium accumulation of capital is ineﬃciently
low, as we noticed in Section 5.1, due to costs of equity and debt financing perceived by
firms, the increase in investment and capital generates a welfare improvement.
The cost of bankruptcy as perceived by firms is a pure transfer, as the fire sale losses of
bankrupt firms provide capital gains for the solvent firms. The same is true for the corporate
income tax, in that case a transfer from solvent firms to consumers. Since the tax revenue is
paid directly to households, one might think this has something to do with the fact that the
tax reduces . In fact, it depends crucially on how the tax revenues are paid out. Suppose
the revenues from the tax were paid to firms instead of households. The distortion will
remain as long as the transfers are lump sum, i.e., not proportional to the firm’s capital
stock. A rational manager will perceive that an increase in the firm’s capital stock increases
its tax liability, but does not increase the transfer received, so he will still have an incentive
to underinvest in equilibrium. Only if the transfer were proportional to the value of equity,
i.e., the tax base, would the distortionary eﬀect disappear.
It is important to note that our result on the welfare benefits of increasing firms’ leverage
does not depend on the absence of deadweight costs of bankruptcy. Suppose we were to
assume that bankrupt firms lose a fraction 0    1 of their output, consumed by the
costs of the bankruptcy process. Each firm would take into account this additional cost of
bankruptcy when it chooses its optimal capital structure. The actual costs of bankruptcy for
the firm (the costs once the pecuniary externality is internalized) in this case are positive,
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but it is still true that they are lower than the costs privately perceived by the firm, since the
latter overestimate the costs of fire sales, due to the pecuniary externality. As a consequence,
it remains true that increasing ∗ will increase the value of capital ∗ and as a result the level
of investment and the capital stock will increase too. Since the equilibrium again exhibits
underinvestment, such increase in the investment level always increases welfare, as in the
situation considered in this section.
But now an increase in ∗ has another eﬀect on welfare, going in the opposite direction,
as it will also increase the deadweight costs of bankruptcy and hence reduce the resources
that a given stock of capital generates for consumption. Which of the two eﬀects dominates
depends on the elasticity of investment with respect to ∗ and hence ∗. In Appendix B
we replicate the analysis for the economy with deadweight costs of bankruptcy and show
that, if the elasticity of investment with respect to ∗ is suﬃciently high, an increase in
∗ is welfare-improving.since the increase in investment is suﬃciently large relative to the
increase in deadweight costs. Thus, the distortion caused by fire sales remains the crucial
determinant of the welfare eﬀects of an increase in firms’ leverage.
6 Conclusion
We have analyzed the firms’ capital structure choice in a dynamic general equilibrium econ-
omy with incomplete markets. Firms face a standard trade-oﬀ between the exemption of
interest payments on debt from the corporate income tax and the risk of costly default. The
latter cost arises from the fact that a firm defaulting on its debt may be forced to liquidate
its assets in a fire sale. Fire sales are endogenously determined in equilibrium and arise from
the illiquidity of the capital market where the firm’s assets are sold. When the corporate
income tax rate is positive we show that fire sales are an essential part of the equilibrium,
the optimal capital structure is uniquely determined in equilibrium and firms’ investment is
lower than at its first-best level. Moreover, the debt/equity ratio chosen by firms is ineﬃ-
ciently low: a regulatory intervention inducing firms to increase their leverage generates an
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increase of firms’ return to capital and hence also of their investment level and of consumers’
welfare.
These findings highlight the importance of recognizing the presence of a pecuniary exter-
nality when evaluating the cost of default due to fire sales. The sale of the assets of bankrupt
firms at fire-sale prices clearly entails a loss for such firms, but constitutes at the same time
a gain for solvent firms who are so able to purchase capital cheaply. Our analysis shows
that, by ignoring the eﬀect of a higher leverage ratio on the fire-sale price of firms’ assets,
firms underestimate the benefits of these purchases and perceive the cost of debt as higher
than what it actually is. It is through such pecuniary externalities, concerning the price of
liquidated assets, that interventions modifying the firms’ capital structure aﬀect welfare in
general equilibrium when markets are incomplete.
We also showed the robustness of our findings to the presence of additional, deadweight
costs of firms’ default given by the destruction of value of the firms’ assets. As long as
firms perceive the negative eﬀect of these deadweight costs on their market value, they will
still overestimate the costs of debt financing and hence an intervention increasing firms’
leverage still increases investment. We can also think however at environments where there
are deadweight costs of bankruptcy that firms do not take into account, for instance costs
imposed on other firms because of the disruption in the financial system23, in which case
a higher leverage may have detrimental eﬀects on firms’ investments. In any case, as we
noticed, in the presence of deadweight costs of bankruptcy higher leverage also means higher
social costs in terms of the destruction of resources produced by bankruptcy, so we have
forces pulling in opposite directions the constrained eﬃcient level of firms’ leverage relative
to the equilibrium one, but the eﬀect we identified remains present.
Although the model we have studied deals with corporate debt, the results are suggestive
for the current debate about the funding and capital structure of financial institutions in the
23Also, in Lorenzoni (2008) and some of the other papers mentioned in the Introduction the capital of
bankrupt firms can only be sold to diﬀerent types of firms who operate a less productive technology, hence
there is a deadweight cost attached to fire sales.
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wake of the financial crisis. A similar exercise for financial institutions would seem to be an
important topic for future research.
In the rest of this section, we briefly discuss the sensitivity of our results to some of the
features of the model.
Aggregate uncertainty A special feature of our model is the fact that the shocks af-
fecting firms are purely idiosyncratic and there is no aggregate risk. There has been a lot
of interest in the macroeconomic literature about the role of financial frictions in the prop-
agation of economic shocks. A large and influential stream of this literature concerns the
financial accelerator. In this literature, recalled in the Introduction, firms’ financing plays
an important role. Because of moral hazard problems, firms’ ability to borrow is limited by
the value of equity or of the assets that serve as collateral. A negative shock to the value
of equity and collateral reduces the firms’ ability to borrow for investment and this in turn
propagates through the cycle. In recent papers (Gertler and Kiyotaki, 2010), the focus has
been shifted to the role of banks and the way in which fluctuations in bank capital restrict
lending and propagate business cycle disturbances.
Our focus, unlike this macroeconomic literature, is on questions of eﬃciency and regu-
lation, rather than business cycle dynamics. Extending the analysis to include aggregate
uncertainty would make the model less tractable, but we believe it would not change the
fundamental qualitative features of the results we obtained. Suppose, for example, that we
introduce an additional, aggregate shock aﬀecting the depreciation of firms’ capital: each
unit of capital used by firm  at date  is reduced, after production of the consumption good,
to  units, where  is a common shock and  and  are independent.24 The law of
motion of capital becomes
+1 = ¯ +  () 
hence the accumulation of capital is now stochastic.
In this simple environment, under suitable conditions on agents’ preferences, both the
24See Appendix B for a formal analysis of this case and the derivation of some properties of equilibria.
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equilibrium value of liquidated capital  and the market value of capital  decrease with the
magnitude of the shock  while the firms’ capital structure, as described by , is not aﬀected
by . Also, the pecuniary externality is still present, leading firms to overestimate the cost of
bankruptcy and debt financing and implying that there is too much debt in the equilibrium
capital structure.
More generally, the extension of the model to allow for aggregate risk could oﬀer some
interesting implications for the properties of the equilibrium prices of debt and equity, as
well as for the pattern of consumption and investment over the business cycle. The eﬀects
of aggregate uncertainty on the firms’ choice of capital structure is also of interest. We plan
to pursue these issues in future work.
Liquidity provision In our stylized model, there is only one technology for producing
consumption goods. The only choice for the firms in the consumption goods sector is how
to finance their purchases of capital goods. In particular, they have no control over the
riskiness of the production technology. This may be seen as a limitation, since in practice
firms may be able to diversify their business lines to reduce the risk of default. To test the
robustness of our results, it is then useful to consider an extension of the analysis where an
alternative, safe technology can be used to produce consumption goods using capital goods.
The safe technology is subject to a non-stochastic depreciation rate 1 − ¯, but has a lower
productivity   .
We can interpret the safe technology as a way to provide liquidity in the economy. It
allows firms to make capital gains from the purchase of assets in fire sales whenever liquidity
is scarce in the system. It can be shown25 that in equilibrium firms will specialize in one of
the technologies. There proves to be in fact no advantage to combining the safe and risky
technology. More interestingly, we find that introducing the safe technology does little to
mitigate the ineﬃciency: on the contrary it generates an additional source of ineﬃciency
and, as long as  is not too high, it reduces welfare. Although the presence of firms using
25The details are in Appendix B.
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the safe technology reduces the scale of the fire sales and raises the price of liquidated
assets, it reduces the returns to capital and hence the incentives to invest. The mechanism
generating the ineﬃciency is now partly diﬀerent: the introduction of a safe technology
diverts the capital gains from purchases at fire-sale prices to the firms choosing the safe but
less productive technology, thus depriving the firms choosing the risky technology of some
of those gains.
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Proofs
Proof of Proposition 1 From the strict concavity of  and the gradient inequality, it
follows that, for any   ˆ,
 () ≤ 
³
ˆ
´
+ 0
³
ˆ
´

³
 − ˆ
´
=
¡
1− ¯¢ ˆ + 0 ³ˆ´³ − ˆ´
 ¡1− ¯¢ ˆ
Hence
 () + ¯  ¡1− ¯¢ ˆ + ¯  ˆ
For any   ˆ,
 () ≤ 
³
ˆ
´
+ 0
³
ˆ
´

³
 − ˆ
´
 ¡1− ¯¢ ˆ + ¡1− ¯¢ ³ − ˆ´
=
¡
1− ¯¢ 
where the second inequality follows from the assumptions made on  (·), implying the exis-
tence of a unique solution for ˆ. Thus,
  ˆ =⇒ +1  
and
  ˆ =⇒ +1  ˆ
Proof of Proposition 2 At an optimal steady state the multipliers {(∗  ∗ )}∞=0 satisfy
∗ = 0 (∗) = ∗0
and hence
∗ = 
∗

0 (∗) =
∗0
∗0∗0 = 
∗0
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for every . The first-order conditions for the steady-state optimum can then be written as
0 (∗) = ∗0 (25)
∗0+ ∗0¯ = ∗0 (26)
∗00 (∗) = ∗0 (27)
Conditions (26) and (27) can be rewritten as

1− ¯ =
∗0
∗0 =
1
0 (∗) (28)
The feasibility conditions become
∗ + ∗ = ∗
and
∗ = ¯∗ +  (∗) 
Thus,
∗ =  (
∗)
1− ¯ 
where ∗ is determined by (28).
Proof of Proposition 4 The derivative of the expression in (13) with respect to +1 is
easily calculated to be
1
1 + 
½
(+ +1+1)  (+1)− +1
µ 
+1 + +1
¶
 (+1) +
+1 (+1 − +1)  (+1) + +1 (1−  (+1))}
=
1
1 + 
½µ
1− +1+1
¶
 (+1) +
µ
1− +1+1
¶
+1+1 (+1) + +1 (1−  (+1))
¾

The first-order condition for an interior solution of the firm’s problem requires this expression
to equal zero, a condition which can be written asµ+1
+1 − 1
¶
(+ +1+1)  (+1) = +1 (1−  (+1)) 
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or µ
1
+1 −
1
+1
¶
(+ +1+1)  (+1)
1−  (+1) =  
A solution to this equation, if it exists, is unique since all terms on the left hand side are
positive and increasing in +1. The term  + +1+1 is in fact clearly increasing in +1,
and so is (+1)
1− (+1) under the assumption of an increasing hazard rate.
From the above expression we then see that when
³
1
+1 − 1+1
´
 (0) ≥  we have a
corner solution with +1 = 0. In contrast, when
³
1
+1 − 1+1
´
 (0)   (and +1  +1)
it is easy to verify that a corner solution with +1 = 1 never exists. By the continuity of
the objective function in +1, a solution always exists, so it follows that an interior solution
exists.
Market clearing in the securities market The value of debt and equity issued by each
firm at any  is equal to the market value of depreciated capital, ¯, plus the value of
newly produced capital goods,  ()  To find the consumer’s savings, we need first to find
the value of the consumer’s wealth in sub-period  of date . This is equal to the sum of
the profits from the capital good sector, the proceeds from the liquidation of firms which
defaulted in this period, and the value of the firms that did not default in the period minus
the corporation tax plus the lump sum transfer from the government. The corporation tax
and the transfer cancel in equilibrium, hence the consumer’s wealth, , is given by
 =  ()−  +
Z 
0
(+ )  +
Z 1


µ
 + 
¶

Using the market clearing condition in the liquidation market (9), this simplifies to:
 =  ()−  + + ¯
Therefore, the securities market clears at date  if
 −  =  ()−  + + ¯ − 
=  ¡¯ +  ()¢
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or
 +  = 
So market clearing in the consumption good market (15) implies market clearing in the
securities markets, as claimed.
Proof of Proposition 6 Equations (17) and (19) come directly from Conditions 4 and 2
of the definition of competitive equilibrium, applied to a steady state. From the equation
specifying the law of motion of the value of the firm, using the fact that at a steady state
1(1 + ∗) = , we then get
∗ = 
½Z ∗
0
(+ ∗) +
Z 1
∗
µ∗
∗ (+ 
∗)− ∗( − ∗)
¶

¾
= 
½Z ∗
0
µ
+ ∗ −
µ∗
∗ − 1
¶
∗
¶
 +
Z 1
∗
µ
+ ∗ +
µ∗
∗ − 1
¶
− ∗( − ∗)
¶

¾
= 
½
+ ∗¯ −
Z 1

∗( − ∗)
¾
where in the last step we used (17) to simplify the expression. Solving for  we get:
∗ = 
1− ¯ +  R 1∗ ( − ∗) 
that is, equation (18).
Let  (∗) denote the solution of equation (18) with respect to  and  (∗) that of (17),
also with respect to  Note that  (∗) is a strictly increasing and  (∗) a strictly decreasing
function of ∗. The remaining condition (19) can then be written asµ
1−  (
∗)
 (∗)
¶µ 
 (∗) + 
∗
¶  (∗)
1−  (∗) =   (29)
and it is clear from inspection that all the terms on the left hand side are increasing in ∗,
so there exists at most one solution, that is one steady state.
To see that there exists a solution to (29), note that as ∗ → 0,  (∗) → ∞ and
 (∗) → 
1−¯+¯ , so for some finite value ∗  0 we have  (∗) =  (∗) and the left hand
side of (29) equals zero. Next, consider what happens as ∗ → 1 and note that  (∗) → 0
and  (∗) → 
1−¯  0, so the left hand side of (29) is positive and arbitrarily large. Thus,
by continuity, there exists a value of 0  ∗  1 satisfying (29).
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Proof of Proposition 7 Consider first the eﬀects of a change in  or . From equation
(17) it is clear that the solution  (∗) is independent of  and  whereas the solution of
equation (18)  (∗   ) is decreasing in  and increasing in . Substituting into (29)µ
1−  (
∗)
 (∗   )
¶µ 
 (∗) + 
∗
¶  (∗)
1−  (∗) =   (30)
we see that an increase in  increases the right hand side and, by decreasing  (∗   ), it
decreases the left hand side. Thus, for the above condition to be satisfied, the left hand
side must be increased and that requires an increase in ∗. Thus, an increase in  increases
∗ and, hence, reduces ∗ =  (∗). Since  (∗   ) is increasing in ∗ and decreasing in
 , the net eﬀect on ∗ (and hence the eﬀect on ∗ and ∗) is uncertain. What we can
say, from equation (18), is that ∗ (and hence ∗ and ∗) will increase if the tax revenue
 R 1∗ ( − ∗)  declines as a result of the increase in  .
Now consider the impact of an increase in . An increase in  will increase  (∗   )
and hence increase the term on the left hand side of (30). For the condition to hold, ∗ must
then decrease to ensure this term stays constant, needed for (30) to hold. This implies that
∗ increases. The overall eﬀect on  of the decrease in ∗ and increase of  since the term on
the left hand side of (30) must stay constant for (19) to hold, is that  increases (actually
more than ). Hence ∗ and ∗ also increase.
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Appendix B
1 Transition dynamics
In this section we complete the equilibrium analysis by studying the properties of the dynam-
ics outside of the steady state. To make the analysis of the transitional dynamics tractable
we will impose the additional assumption that consumers are risk neutral,
 () = , for all  ≥ 0 (1)
As a consequence, the stochastic discount factor is constant and equal to  and, hence,
1
1 + ∗ = , for all 
in any equilibrium. On the basis of assumption (1), we show in this section that the equi-
librium dynamics converges monotonically to the steady state and the equilibrium capital
structure is constant and equal to the steady-state capital structure at each point on the
transition path.
Under assumption (1), the equilibrium conditions outside the steady state can be re-
duced to a system of two equations. From the market-clearing condition in sub-period 
(Equilibrium Condition 4), we have
 = (1−  ())R 
0
  (2)
Letting  () denote the term on the right hand side of (2), we readily see that  () is a
continuously decreasing function of  on the interval [0 1], for all  ≥ 1. The first-order
condition for the optimal capital structure (Equilibrium Condition 2) can then be rewritten
as µ
1−  (+1)+1
¶µ 
 (+1) + +1
¶  (+1)
1−  (+1) =   (3)
Holding +1 constant, an increase in +1 increases the left hand side of (3), so the change
in +1 must decrease
³
1− (+1)+1
´
. In other words, an increase in +1 must decrease +1.
This shows that, if we denote by  (+1) the solution of (3) with respect to   (+1) is
1
a continuously decreasing function of  on the interval [0 1], for all  ≥ 1. The profit-
maximization condition of the capital good producers (Equilibrium Condition 1),
0() = 1 (4)
implies that the investment level  = () is a well defined and strictly increasing function
of . Hence (()) is a well defined and decreasing function of  on the interval [0 1]  for
all  ≥ 0.
Substituting these functions for    into the expressions specifying the law of motion
of the market value of the firms in the consumption goods sector (in Equilibrium Condition
2)1 and the capital market-clearing (Equilibrium Condition 6), we obtain the system of two
diﬀerence equations below in  and :
() = 
∙
+ (+1)¯ − (+1)
Z 1
+1
( − +1)
¸
(5)
+1 = ¯ + (()) (6)
This dynamic system can be solved for the values {( )}∞=1, subject to the initial condi-
tions determining2 1. This sequence defines an equilibrium trajectory corresponding to an
equilibrium as defined in Definition 5.
The first of these, Equation (5), only depends on . Hence, the dynamics for  is
determined by that equation and does not depend on . We show in the sequel that the
dynamics for  is as described in the following figure:
where the red line is the graph of the term on the right hand side of (5), and the blue
line is the graph of the term on the left hand side, both regarded as functions of . The
1We also used (2) to simplify the expression in (5), as we did in the proofS of Propositions 7 and 8.
2The initial conditions are given by 1 = ¯¯0 + (0) with 0 determined by

h
+ (1)¯ − (1) R 11( − 1)i0(0) = 1 as a function of 1.
2
two curves intersect at the unique steady-state value  = ∗. At that point the slope of
the red curve is flatter than the slope of the blue curve. Also, both curves are negatively
sloped. This implies that, starting at any initial point 1 6= ∗, the trajectory {} satisfying
the diﬀerence equation must diverge away from ∗. In fact, if 1  ∗  is monotonically
increasing until it reaches a value, strictly smaller than one, beyond which a solution to (5)
no longer exists.3 On the other hand, if 1  ∗ both curves diverge to infinity and the
dynamics is monotonically decreasing approaching zero. This is also unfeasible, since we see
from (3), (2), (4) that when  → 0, , ,  and hence also  tend to infinity, which violate
the boundedness property established in Proposition 1.
This shows that in any competitive equilibrium we must have  = ∗ for all . From this
it follows that prices and the investment level are constant along the equilibrium path, at
the levels  = (∗) = ∗,  = (∗) = ∗ and  =  (∗) = ∗, for all , while the dynamics
of the capital stock is determined by the law of motion
+1 = ¯ +  (∗) 
with 1 determined by the initial conditions. Then
++1 =
³
¯ + ¯2 + · · ·+ ¯
´
 (∗) + ¯+1
→  (
∗)
1− ¯ = 
∗ as  →∞
So the capital stock converges to its steady-state value. We have thus established the fol-
lowing:
Claim 1 Let {( )}∞=1 be a solution of the two-equation system (5-6) satisfying 0 = ¯0.
Then {( )}∞=1 is an equilibrium trajectory only if, for all  ≥ 1,  = ∗, where ∗ is the
uniquely determined steady-state capital structure. Furthermore,  converges monotonically
to its steady-state value, ∗.
Proof. In order to complete the proof of the proposition, we need to characterize the
dynamics of the two-equation system (5-6) above. We show first that, at the unique steady-
state value  = ∗, the derivative of the term on the left hand side of (5), 0 (∗), is negative
and strictly smaller than the derivative of the term on the right hand side. Denoting the
term on the right hand side by  (+1), with  () defined by
 () = 
∙
+ ()¯ − ()
Z 1

( − )
¸

we have
0 (∗) = 0 (∗) ¯ − 0 (∗)
Z 1

( − ) +  (∗) (1−  (∗))
 0 (∗) ¯  0 (∗) 
3If  → 1, the term on the right hand side converges to  and the one on the left hand side converges to
0. Thus for some finite value of  there is no value of +1 that satisfies equation (5).
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as claimed. The first inequality follows from the fact that the second and third terms on the
right hand side of the first expression are positive, the second inequality from the fact that
0 (∗) is negative and 0  ¯  1.
Since the steady state is unique, this proves that
 () ≷  () as  ≶ ∗
for all 0    1.
We show next that 0 ()  0, for all 0    1. This is equivalent to
− 
0
 
 (1−  ())
¯ −  R 1 ( − )  (7)
Diﬀerentiating (3) we get
0
 =


⎛
⎝ ³

 + 
´ 
1−
⎞
⎠  +
0
 
Also, from (2) we get
0 = −
R 
0
 −(1−  )¡R 
0
¢2 
Since −0  0, a suﬃcient condition for (7) to hold is that
− 
⎛
⎝ ³

 + 
´ 
1−
⎞
⎠  = −


h³

2 0 − 1
´ ¡ 
1−
¢− ³ + ´  ¡ 1− ¢i³

 + 
´2 ¡ 
1−
¢2   (1−  )¯ −  R 1 ( − ) 
Recall that the hazard rate (1− ) is assumed to be increasing. Hence the above inequality
holds if


³
1− 2 0
´
³

 + 
´2 ¡ 
1−
¢  (1−  )¯ −  R 1 ( − ) 
Substituting the expression for 0 derived above, this inequality can be rewritten as follows


1 + 2
  0 +(1− )
(
 
0 )
2³

 + 
´2  ¯ −  R 1 ( − ) 
or, using (2) to substitute for 


1
 +
 
0 +(1− )
(1− )2³ 
0 
1− + 
´2  1¯ −  R 1 ( − ) 
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Note that the term on the left hand side can be rewritten as


"
(1−  )2¡R 
0
 + (1−  )¢2 + 1R 0  + (1−  )
#
 1R 
0
 + (1−  ) 
where the inequality sign follows from the fact that   1. Hence (7) holds if
¯ − 
Z 1

( − ) 
Z 
0
 + (1−  )
or
¯ −
Z 
0
 − 
Z 1

 =
Z 1

 (1− )  (1−  )(1− )
which is always satisfied. This completes the proof that 0 ()  0, for all 0    1.
It is immediate to see from (2) that  ()→∞ as  → 0 and  ()→ 0 as  → 1. Since
the first-order condition (3) implies that +1  +1, we have  () → ∞ as  → 0. And
since  () → ∞ as  → 1, we must have  () → 0 as  → 1. Then  () → ∞ (resp.
0) as  → 0 (resp. 1), whereas  () behaves like  £+ (1− ) ¯ ()¤ as  → 0, that is,
 ()→∞ as  → 0, and  ()→  as  → 1.
Any sequence {} satisfying the diﬀerence equation (3) that does not begin at ∗ will
diverge either to 0 or 1. If  → 1, then within a finite number of steps  ()     ()
for any , so there does not exist a continuation value +1 that satisfies  () =  (+1).
If  → 0, on the other hand, then  () → ∞, which implies that  → ∞ and  → ∞,
violating the boundedness property established in Proposition 1. Thus, no divergent sequence
corresponds to an equilibrium and the only possible equilibrium sequence is  = ∗ for all
.
2 Liquidity provision
Fire sales are a necessary element of equilibrium, as we have shown. Equity is dominated by
debt finance unless bankruptcy is perceived to be costly and, in equilibrium, both debt and
equity finance must be used. One might think that speculators would have an incentive to
accumulate liquidity in order to buy assets at fire sale prices, but speculation does little to
restore the eﬃciency of equilibrium. As long as liquid assets yield a low return, speculators
will not hold them unless they can expect capital gains from buying assets in the fire sale.
The supply of liquidity will never be suﬃcient to eliminate fire sales. In fact, the presence of
liquid assets can make the competitive equilibrium less eﬃcient. As we have pointed out, the
“costs” of bankruptcy are a transfer rather than a true economic cost. For the same reason,
the capital gains from buying assets in fire sales are also a transfer. So holding low-yielding
liquid assets in order to buy up assets in a fire sale is always ineﬃcient. In fact, it can make
everyone worse oﬀ than in an economy without liquid assets.4
4Investing in a safe technology that is less productive than the risky technology is always ineﬃcient. This
does not mean, however, that introducing a safe technology cannot increase equilibrium welfare. Since the
5
To represent the possibility of speculative arbitrage to provide liquidity in the market, we
extend the analysis by introducing an additional, “safe” technology to produce the consump-
tion good using the capital good, also subject to constant returns to scale. We assume that
one unit of capital applied to this technology produces  units of the good and that after
depreciation the amount of capital remaining is ¯. The two technologies have then the same
average depreciation rate but the depreciation rate of the safe technology is deterministic.
We assume that   ; otherwise, the safe technology would dominate the risky technology.
Each firm in the consumption good sector now faces a technology choice, in addition to
the choice of its capital structure. Otherwise, the definition of a competitive equilibrium is
unchanged.
To analyze the firms’ technology choice, consider a firm which has one unit of capital at
date . If the capital is entirely invested in the safe technology, the optimal capital structure
is full debt financing, since there is no default risk in this case. At date  + 1 the firm
produces  units of goods which it retains and uses to buy +1 units of capital. Then, at
the end of date +1, the firm has +1 + ¯ units of capital which is valued at +1
³

+1 + ¯
´
.
In equilibrium, it is optimal for the firm to invest all its capital in the safe technology if and
only if
 = 1
1 + +1
µ 
+1 + ¯
¶
 (8)
In addition, the zero profit condition requires that the nominal value of the debt issued by
the firm fully investing in the safe technology is equal to +1 =  + +1¯
We establish first some properties of the equilibrium technology choice.
Claim 2 At a competitive equilibrium, if +1  +1 it is never optimal for a consumption
good producer to use both technologies at the same time.
Proof. To see this, suppose to the contrary that at some date  a firm with one unit of
capital at its disposal devotes a fraction  of it to the risky technology and the remaining
fraction 1−  to the safe technology. As usual, we define the break even point +1 for a debt
with nominal value +1 as:
+ (1− ) + +1 ¡+1 + (1− ) ¯¢ = +1
Then the expected value of the firm at date + 1 is given byZ +1
0
¡+ (1− ) + +1 ¡+1 + (1− ) ¯¢¢ +Z 1
+1
∙+1
+1
¡+ (1− ) + +1 ¡+1 + (1− ) ¯¢¢− +1 (+1 − +1)¸ 
steady-state equilibrium is ineﬃcient to begin with, introducing an ineﬃcient techology can make everyone
better oﬀ. The crucial question is how diﬀerent the productivities of the two technologies are. We show in
this section that if the productivity diﬀerence is suﬃciently small, a steady-state equilibrium with the safe
technology will be preferred to a steady-state equilibrium without it.
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since the tax base is
+1
+1
£+ (1− ) + +1 ¡+1 + (1− ) ¯¢− +1¤ =
+1
+1
£+ (1− ) + +1 ¡+1 + (1− ) ¯¢¤−+1+1 £+ (1− ) + +1 ¡+1 + (1− ) ¯¢¤ =
+1 (+1 − +1) 
We show below that the firm can achieve a higher value by splitting into two separate
entities, of size respectively  and 1−  the first one investing fully in the risky technology
and the second one investing fully in the safe one. The nominal value of the debt in the
second entity is set at (1− ) + +1 (1− ) ¯ = +1 while the one in the first entity is+ +1+1 = +1, that is the break even point is kept at +1 The sum of the value of
these two entities is then

∙Z +1
0
(+ +1+1)  +
Z 1
+1
µ+1
+1 (+ +1+1)− +1 (+1 − +1)
¶

¸
+
(1− )
∙+1
+1 ( + +1¯)
¸
which is clearly strictly greater than the value of the combined firm above, as long as +1 
+1. Moreover, the firm can also achieve a higher value by investing all the capital at its
disposal in the risky technology, if the first term in square brackets is larger than the second
one, and otherwise in the safe technology.
This claim is the result of the non-convexity of the firm’s objective function associated
with costly bankruptcy. If the firm has a positive amount of debt and a positive probability of
default, the firm can increase its value by shifting all its production to the risky technology,
keeping the default probability and the default cost unchanged and enjoying the higher
returns of the technology, or to the safe technology which allows to avoid all the default risk
and cost.
We show next that, as in the specification considered in the paper, in equilibrium we
always have +1  +1 Suppose not, that is we have +1 = +1 In that case there is no
default cost, hence firms by investing in the risky technology and fully financing with debt
attain a higher value, since    and there is no cost attached to debt financing. But if
all firms only invest in the risky technology we have shown in the paper there can be no
equilibrium where +1 = +1
Since +1  +1 the market clearing condition in the liquidation market implies that
at least a positive fraction of firms invest in the risky technology. Hence at a competitive
equilibrium two possible cases arise. The first one is a situation where all firms invest in
the risky technology. The equilibrium is then the same as in the situation considered in the
paper. More precisely, a competitive equilibrium
©¡∗  ∗  ∗+1 ∗  ∗+1 ∗  ∗ ¢ª∞=0 according
to Definition 5 is also an equilibrium when consumption good producers also face a choice
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between a risky and a safe technology provided the equilibrium values satisfy the following
condition, for all 
∗ ≥ 11 + ∗ 
∗+1
µ 
∗+1 + ¯
¶
 (9)
that is, no producer can gain at these prices by switching from the risky to the safe technology.
The second case arises when (9) is violated, in which case the competitive equilibrium is
diﬀerent and entails a positive fraction (1−∗∗ ) ∈ (0 1) of firms using the safe technology. In
this case, the equilibrium conditions need to be partly modified, in particular the liquidation
market clearing condition, which becomes
∗∗
Z ∗∗
0
 = ∗∗  (1−  (∗∗ )) + (1− ∗∗ ) (10)
to reflect the fact that the buyers of capital goods now include the solvent firms investing
in the risky technology and all the firms investing in the safe technology, as well as the
consumption good market clearing condition,
∗∗ ∗∗ + (1− ∗∗ ) ∗∗ = ∗∗ + ∗∗  (11)
to reflect the diﬀering productivities of the two technologies. In addition, condition (8),
requiring that firms must be indiﬀerent between the safe and risky technologies, must also
hold.
We investigate in what follows the welfare properties of these equilibria. We show in
particular that the availability of an alternative, safe technology, which allows firms to avoid
the default risk, generates an additional source of ineﬃciency.
Claim 3 There exists a unique value of , denoted by ¯  0, such that if  ≤ ¯ we have
∗∗ = 1 in any steady-state equilibrium and the other values are (∗ ∗ ∗ ∗ ∗ ∗ ∗ ∗).
By contrast, for some   0 and any  ∈ ¡¯ ¯ + ¢, ∗∗  1 and the consumption level ∗∗
is lower than the equilibrium level when the safe technology is not available, ∗.
Proof. When  = ¯ the steady state equilibrium is the same as in the situation considered
in the paper, characterized in Proposition 7. Hence the equation determining the value of
the firm is still given by (as in Equilibrium condition 2):
∗ = 
½Z ∗
0
(+ ∗)  +
Z 1
∗
µ∗
∗ (+ 
∗)− ∗ ( − ∗)
¶

¾
(12)
The change in the equilibrium value of  when  is increased to ¯ +  is obtained by
diﬀerentiating this equation with respect to  and evaluating the derivative at  = ¯ :

 = 
½µZ ∗
0

¶ 
 +
µ
1
∗
Z 1
∗
(+ ∗) 
¶ 

−
µ ∗
∗2
Z 1
∗∗

¶ 
 −
µ

Z 1
∗
( − ) 
¶ 

¾

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Rearranging, we getµ
1− ∗
Z 1
∗∗
(+ ∗)  + 
Z 1
∗
( − ) 
¶ 
 =

µZ ∗
0
 − 
∗
∗2
Z 1
∗

¶ 
 
Now, using the market-clearing condition
∗ = (1−  (
∗))R ∗
0
()  (13)
we see that

∗
Z 1
∗
(+ ∗)  = ∗
µ
 (1−  (∗)) +
Z 1
∗
∗
¶
=

∗
µ
∗
Z ∗
0
 + ∗
Z 1
∗

¶
= ¯  1
So,
1− ∗
Z 1
∗
(+ ∗)  + 
Z 1
∗
( − )  = 1− ¯ + 
Z 1
∗
( − ) 
 1− ¯  0
Similarly, again using (13),Z ∗
0
 − 
∗
∗2
Z 1
∗
 =
Z 
0
 − 
∗
∗
 (1−  (∗))
∗

Z ∗
0
 −
Z ∗
0
 = 0
From these two inequalities, it follows that  and

 have opposite signs. Since

  0
follows from
∗∗ = (¯ + )
1− ¯ 
we have proved that   0.
The change in the steady-state equilibrium consumption level is then obtained by diﬀer-
entiating (11) with respect to  and evaluating the derivative at  = ¯:
∗∗ = ∗∗ − ∗∗ + (−)∗∗∗ (14)
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since ∗ = 1. The profit maximization condition ∗0 (∗) = 1 implies, as already shown in the
previous section, that a reduction in ∗∗ reduces ∗∗, and the law of motion ∗∗ =  (∗∗)+¯∗∗
implies that a reduction in ∗∗ reduces ∗∗:
∗∗ = 
0 (∗)
1− ¯ 
∗∗
Also, ∗∗ ≤ 0 since ∗ = 1 at the equilibrium associated with  = ¯. Then inspection of
(14) yields
∗∗  ∗∗ − ∗∗
=
µ0 (∗)
1− ¯ − 1
¶
∗∗
=
Ã

∗ ¡1− ¯¢ − 1
!
∗∗
so a suﬃcient condition for ∗∗  0 is ∗ ¡1− ¯¢  . But it is clear from (12) that
∗ ≤ 
n
1 + ¯ + ¡¯¢2 + · · · ¡¯¢ + · · ·o
=

1− ¯ 

1− ¯ 
This completes the proof of the proposition.
In what follows we focus again our attention on the case where (1) holds, that is consumers
are risk neutral. Hence, the critical value of , denoted by ¯, is given by
¯ = 
∗ ¡1− ¯¢
 
where ∗ is the price of liquidated capital at a steady-state equilibrium of the economy with no
safe technology. At this steady-state equilibrium price, (9) holds with equality when  = ¯,
hence firms are indiﬀerent between using the safe and risky technologies. At ¯+  ¯, (9)
no longer holds, the steady-state equilibrium involves a positive fraction of firms 1− ∗∗  0
adopting the safe technology and a higher steady-state equilibrium value of ,
∗∗ = (¯ + )
1− ¯  (15)
We showed in the proof of Claim 3 that equilibrium welfare is lower at a new steady-state
equilibrium than at the original one, with no safe technology. Since the original allocation,
with all firms investing in the risky technology, clearly remains feasible, this shows that the
equilibrium indeed exhibits an ineﬃcient technology choice, with excessive investment in the
safe technology, as claimed.
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The intuition for the result is as follows. At the competitive equilibrium with = ¯+,
a positive fraction of firms adopt the safe technology, hence the liquidity available is higher
and  higher. However, as we show in the proof, the market value of the firm, , decreases,
which implies that the steady-state investment and capital stock both decrease. This drop
in  reflects the fact that an ineﬃcient technology is used, thus reducing the amount of
available resources (a real cost in this case).
It is interesting to note that as  is increased further and, in particular, as  approaches
, the safe technology is in the limit as productive as the risky one and both consumption
and the value of the firm approach their first best steady state levels. Thus, the ineﬃciency
vanishes in the limit. This shows that the relationship between the equilibrium value of 
and  is non monotonic: if we keep increasing , eventually  must increase as well. The
availability of a safe technology that can provide liquidity reduces the cost for firms of issuing
debt and hence induces firms to issue more debt, which as we saw is beneficial. The cost is
the one associated with the use of an ineﬃcient technology. As  keeps increasing, the first,
positive eﬀect ends up prevailing over the second, negative one.
3 Deadweight costs of bankruptcy
We have analyzed a model in which there are no deadweight costs of bankruptcy, but the
model is easily extended to allow for deadweight costs in addition to the perceived costs of
fire sales. The easiest way to model deadweight costs of bankruptcy is to assume that some
of the firm’s output is consumed by the costs of the bankruptcy process. Let 0    1
denote the fraction of output absorbed by bankruptcy costs. Then a firm that defaults will
have  (1− ) units of output to distribute to creditors in liquidation. We are now ready
to state the equations defining a competitive equilibrium in the environment described. The
baseline model corresponds to the case when  = 0, of course.
With this change in our assumptions, the definition of equilibrium has to be changed as
follows. The firm at date  now wishes to maximize5
1
1 + 
½Z +1
0
( (1− ) + +1+1)  +
Z 1
+1
∙
+1
µ 
+1 + +1
¶
− +1 (+1 − +1)
¸

¾
with respect to +1. The only diﬀerence in the objective function is the appearance of  in
the payoﬀ to firms with shock +1  +1. The first-order condition for an optimum isµ
1− − +1+1
¶
 (+1) +
µ
1− +1+1
¶
+1+1 (+1) + +1 (1−  (+1)) = 0
which can be rewritten as½µ
1
+1 −
1− 
+1
¶
+
µ
1
+1 −
1
+1
¶
+1+1
¾  (+1)
1−  (+1) =   (16)
5The breakeven point +1 is defined in the usual way + +1+1 = +1.
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If  = 0, this reduces to the usual expression in Equilibrium Condition 2.
The optimal capital structure condition (2.) in the definition of a competitive equilibrium
is now modified as follows: for every date  ≥ 0, the capital structure ∗+1 of the firms in the
consumption good sector satisfies (16) and the present value of firms in this sector satisfies
the law of motion
(1 + ∗ ) ∗ =
½Z ∗+1
0
¡ (1− ) + ∗+1+1¢  +Z 1
∗+1
µ
∗+1
µ 
∗+1 + +1
¶
− ∗+1 (+1 − +1)
¶

)
The other conditions remain the same.
Using the liquidation market-clearing condition (4.), the law of motion for ∗ can be
simplified to
(1 + ∗ ) ∗ =
(
 (1−  (∗ )) + ∗+1¯ − ∗+1
Z 1
∗+1
¡+1 − ∗+1¢ 
)

since capital gains and losses sum to zero for the economy. In the steady state, the law of
motion becomes
∗ = 
½
 (1−  (∗)) + ∗¯ − ∗
Z 1
∗
( − ∗) 
¾

From the steady state law of motion for ∗,
∆∗ = ∆
½
 (1−  (∗)) + ∗¯ − ∗
Z 1
∗
( − ∗) 
¾
+  (∆)
= 
½
− 0 (∗)∆∗ + ¯∆∗ − ∆∗
Z 1
∗
( − ∗)  + ∗ (1−  (∗))∆∗
¾
+  (∆) 
From the first-order conditions for the choice of ∗,
− (∗)∆∗ + ∗ (1−  (∗))∆∗ =
µ∗
∗ − 1
¶
(+ ∗∗)  (∗)∆∗
Then
∆∗ = 
½µ∗
∗ − 1
¶
(+ ∗∗)  (∗)∆∗ + ¯∆∗ − ∆∗
Z 1
∗
( − ∗) 
¾
 
½µ∗
∗ − 1
¶
(+ ∗∗)  (∗)∆∗ + ¯∆∗ −  ¯∆∗
¾
 
½µ∗
∗ − 1
¶
(+ ∗∗)  (∗)∆∗
¾
 0
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since   1.
The next task is to derive conditions under which the competitive equilibria are con-
strained ineﬃcient. We continue to focus our attention on the risk neutral case, that is (1)
holds.
Suppose the economy is in a steady-state equilibrium and consider the eﬀect of modifying
the capital structure by increasing ∗. Suppose there is a permanent, exogenous change ∆
starting at some fixed but arbitrary date, which we take without loss of generality to be
 = 1. The induced changes in the equilibrium variables  and  are obtained from the
market-clearing condition in sub-period  and the law of motion of . After substituting
the new value of , the new values of  and  are determined by
 (1−  (∗ +∆)) = 
Z ∗+∆
0
 (17)
and
−1 = 
½
 (1−  (∗ +∆)) + ¯ − 
Z 1
∗+∆
( − ∗ −∆)
¾
 (18)
for all   0. We see from (17) that the new equilibrium value for  is the same for all   0
and from (18) we obtain a first-order diﬀerence equation in . The solution of this equation
diverges monotonically since the coeﬃcient on  has absolute value¯¯¯¯
¯ − 
Z 1
∗+∆
( − ∗ −∆)
¯¯¯¯
≤ max©¯  ¯ª = ¯  1
Hence, the only admissible solution is obtained by setting  equal to its steady-state value:
0 =  = ∗ +∆ =  (1−  (
∗ +∆))
1− ¯ +  R 1∗+∆ ( − ∗ −∆)   (19)
The remaining equilibrium variables are determined by the optimality condition for the
capital goods producers and the capital market clearing condition, which are both unchanged.
Since, by the previous argument,  is equal to its new steady-state equilibrium value, ∗+∆,
for  ≥ 0, we have  = ∗ +∆ for all  ≥ 0, where the sign of ∆ equals the sign of ∆.
The dynamics for consumption is given by the following equations:
0 =  (1−  (∗)) ∗ − (∗ +∆) 
1 =  (1−  (∗ +∆)) ¡¯∗ +  (∗ +∆)¢− (∗ +∆) 
 =  (1−  (∗ +∆))
h
¯∗ +  (∗ +∆) (1 + ¯ + + ¯−1)
i
− (∗ +∆) for all  ≥ 2
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Hence, the change in consumption is approximated by
∆0 = −∆
∆1 = − 0 (∗) ∗∆ + (1−  (∗))0 (∗)∆ −∆
∆ = − 0 (∗) ∗∆ +(1−  (∗))(1 + ¯ + + ¯−1)0 (∗)∆ −∆
= − 0 (∗) ∗∆ +
(
−1 + (1−  (∗)) 1− ¯

1− ¯ 
0 (∗)
)
∆ ∀ ≥ 2
The sign of the eﬀect on welfare of this intervention is equal to the sign of
∞X
=0
∆ = − 
1− 
0 (∗) ∗∆
+
(
1
1− 
µ
−1 + (1−  (∗)) 
1− ¯
0 (∗)
¶
−
∞X
=1
¡¯¢ (1−  (∗)) 1
1− ¯
0 (∗)
)
∆
The term in brackets in this expression is strictly positive because, using the expression of
the steady state equilibrium value of ∗ derived above, we get
1
0 (∗) = 
∗ =
 (1−  (∗ ))
1− 
³
¯ −  R 1∗ ∗ ( − ∗) ´
  (1−  (
∗ ))
1− ¯ 
and hence
1
1− 
µ
−1 + (1−  (∗)) 
1− ¯
0 (∗)
¶
−
∞X
=1
¡¯¢ (1−  (∗)) 1
1− ¯
0 (∗) =
− 1
1−  +
µ
 (1−  (∗)) 1
1− ¯
0 (∗)
¶µ 
1−  −
¯
1− ¯
¶
=
− 1
1−  + ( (1−  (
∗))0 (∗))
Ã
¡
1− ¯¢ (1− )
!
 0
Letting
1 = 
1− 
0 (∗)  and 2 = − 1
1−  +
 (1−  (∗))
∗
Ã
¡
1− ¯¢ (1− )
!

where we replaced 0 (∗) by the inverse of ∗ and 1 and 2 are positive. The welfare
criterion can be written as
∆ = −1∗∆ +2∆
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so ∆  0 if and only if ∆
∆
1
∗ 
1
2 
In other words, an increase in ∗ will increase welfare if and only if the response of investment
to the change in capital structure is suﬃciently large.
To illustrate, suppose the production function for capital goods is given by
 () = 1
1− 
1−
Then ∗ = (∗) and ∗ = (∗) 1 . The equilibrium variables ∗, ∗ and ∗ are defined by the
market-clearing condition
∗ =  (1−  ())R ∗
0
 
the steady-state law of motion
∗ =  (1−  (
∗))
1− 
³
¯ −  R 1∗ ( − ∗) ´ 
and the first-order condition½µ
1
∗ −
1− 
∗
¶
+
µ
1
∗ −
1
∗
¶
∗∗
¾  (∗)
1−  (∗) =  
Note that this subsystem does not depend on the parameter . Then the constants 1 and
2 are also independent of  (when we have substituted 1∗ for 0 (∗)).
We can approximate ∆∆ can be approximated by   , and since   0 is indepen-
dent of , the necessary and suﬃcient condition for an increase in welfare is


1
∗ 
1
2
∗
∗ 
where the right hand side is independent of . Now
∗ =  (
∗)
1− ¯
=
³
(∗) 1
´1−
(1− ) ¡1− ¯¢
and 
 =
1
 (
∗)
1−

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so


1
∗ =
1
 (
∗)
1−

Ã
(∗) 1−
(1− ) ¡1− ¯¢
!−1
=
1
 (1− )
¡
1− ¯¢
which diverges to infinity as  → 0. Thus, the inequality is satisfied if and only if  is
positive and suﬃciently close to zero.
Proposition 4 Suppose that the production function  has the parametric form  () =
1
1−1−, for some parameter 0    1, and assume that consumers are risk neutral: () ≡ . Let (∗ ∗ ∗ ∗ ∗ ∗ ∗) be a steady-state equilibrium of the model. Then for
some 0  ¯  1 and all 0    ¯, a small increase in ∗ will increase welfare.
This result is diﬀerent from the constrained ineﬃciency of equilibrium in the original
model without deadweight costs. In both cases, there is underinvestment in the steady
state: the steady-state capital stock ∗ is smaller than the first-best requires and an increase
in ∗ will increase welfare. When there are deadweight costs, however, an increase in ∗
will not necessarily achieve a welfare improvement. Increasing ∗ will increase the value of
capital ∗ and investment and the capital stock will increase as a result; but an increase in
∗ will also increase the deadweight costs of bankruptcy. Which eﬀect dominates depends
on the elasticity of investment with respect to ∗ and hence ∗. If  is suﬃciently small, the
response of investment will be large enough that the benefits of an increase in ∗ outweigh
the costs. Otherwise, the costs outweigh the benefits.
In the original model, with  = 0, a change in ∗ has no direct eﬀect on welfare. The
costs of debt and equity as perceived by firms, that is the costs of fire sales in the case of debt
and taxes in the case of equity, are not true economic costs. Consequently, a change in ∗
has no direct implication for the level of output and the resources available for consumption.
The only thing that matters is that the induced fall in the taxes paid increases the value
of capital and stimulates investment, thus oﬀsetting the underinvestment that results from
the ‘tax’ on capital. It does not matter how small the increase in investment is. Any
increase in investment will increase welfare. When there are deadweight costs of default,
increasing ∗ has both costs and benefits and the relative size of the two eﬀects is critical to
the determination of the change in welfare.
Example Let  = 1,  = 09,  = 03,  = 01,  v  [0 1], and
 () = 1
1− 
1−
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Then  can be defined by the market-clearing condition
∗ =  (1−  ())R ∗
0

=
1− ∗
05 (∗)2
and the steady-state value of ∗ is given by
∗ = 
½
 (1−  (∗)) + ∗¯ − ∗
Z 1
∗
( − ∗) 
¾
=
 (1−  (∗))
1− 
³
¯ −  R 1∗ ( − ∗) ´
=
(09) (1− (01) ∗)
1− (09) ¡05− (03) (05) (1− ∗)2¢
=
09− 009∗
0135(∗)2 − 027∗ + 0685 
Finally, ∗ is determined by the first-order condition½µ
1
∗ −
1− 
∗
¶
+
µ
1
∗ −
1
∗
¶
∗∗
¾  (∗)
1−  (∗) = 
or
½µ
1
∗ −
09
∗
¶
+
µ
1
∗ −
1
∗
¶
∗∗
¾
1
1− ∗ = 03
Substituting for the values for ∗ and ∗ from the equations above, we obtainµµ
052
1−  −
01352 − 027 + 0685
09− 009
¶
+
µ
052
1−  −
01352 − 027 + 0685
09− 009
¶
1− 
05
¶
1
1−  = 03
The solution is  = 06818. Substituting into the equations for  and  yields
 = 1− 06818
05 (06818)2
= 1369
and
 = 09− 009 (06818)
0135(06818)2 − 027 (06818) + 0685
= 14878
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Now, the expression for the change in welfare is
∞X
=0
∆ = − 
1− 
0 (∗) ∗∆
+
(
1
1− 
µ
−1 + (1−  (∗)) 
1− ¯
0 (∗)
¶
−
∞X
=1
¡¯¢ (1−  (∗)) 1
1− ¯
0 (∗)
)
∆
= −(09) (01)
1− 09 
∗∆
+
(
1
1− 09
µ
−1 + (1− (01) (06818)) 2
14878
¶
−
∞X
=1
(045) (1− 01 (06818)) 2
14878
)
∆
= − (09) ∗∆ + (024866)∆
where we have replaced 0 (∗) with 1∗ . The welfare change will be positive if and only if
∆
∆ 
(09) ∗
024866 = 36194
∗
Since 0 () = −,
∗ = (∗) 1
and
∗ =  (
∗)
1− ¯ =
2 (∗) 1−
1−  =
2 (14878) 1−
1−  
From the steady state expression for ∗ we calculate
∆∗ = 
½
− 0 (∗)∆∗ + ¯∆∗ − ∆∗
Z 1
∗
( − ∗)  + ∗ (1−  (∗))∆∗
¾
=
− 0 (∗) + ∗ (1−  (∗))
1− 
³
¯ −  R 1∗ ( − ∗) ´ ∆∗
=
−01 + (03) (14878) (1− 06818)
1− (09) ¡(05)− (03) (05) ¡1− (06818)2¢¢∆∗
= 0067538∆∗
Then
∆
∆ =




= (0067538) 1 (14878)
1
−1
= 0045395(14878)
1


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Then the condition for a welfare improvement becomes
(0045395) (14878)
1

  36194
∗
= (048476) 2 (14878)
1−

1− 
which is satisfied if and only if 0    0065125.
4 Aggregate uncertainty
To introduce aggregate uncertainty, we assume that the distribution of depreciation rates is
subject to aggregate shocks. Let {} be a series of i.i.d. random variables taking values in
a finite set S with probability density π = {}∈S . After production of the consumption
good by an arbitrary firm  at date , one unit of capital is reduced to  units of capital,
where  is the usual idiosyncractic shock and  is a common shock. We assume that 
and  are independent for each  and .
In this environment both the stock of capital, consumption, investment and prices will
depend on the aggregate shock. We show in what follows that, again under the assumption
that consumers are risk neutral, that is (1) holds, an equilibrium exists where prices are
inversely related to the realization of the aggregate state, +1 () = +1, +1 () = +1
for any  ∈ S and some +1 +1 while the default threshold is independent of the state,
+1 () = +1, for any .
The market-clearing condition in the liquidation market in sub-period  (Equilibrium
Condition 4) in every state  is then
+1 () =  (1−  (+1))R +1
0
+1 
or, using the above specification,
+1 =  (1−  (+1))R +1
0
+1
The tax base is again the value of the firm’s equity at the beginning of sub-period ,
whenever it is non negative, that is, the diﬀerence between the value of capital owned by the
firm and the value of (renegotiated) debt
+1 ()
µ 
+1 () + +1
¶
− +1 ()
µ +1
+1()
¶

Hence, the corporate income tax payment due at date  + 1 in state , using the definition
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of the default threshold, + +1 () +1 = +1 is
 max
½
+1 ()
µ 
+1 () + +1
¶
− +1 ()
µ +1
+1 ()
¶
 0
¾
=  max
½+1 ()
+1 () (+ +1 () +1 −− +1 () +1)  0
¾
=  max {+1 (+1 − +1)  0} 
The optimal capital structure is then obtained as a solution of the following problem of
maximizing the the firm’s market value at 
max+1
X
∈S
 () 
( R +1
0
(+ +1 () +1) +R 1
+1
h
+1 ()
³

+1() + +1
´
− +1 ()  (+1 − +1)
i )  =

Z +1
0
(+ +1+1)  +
Z 1
+1
∙
+1
µ 
+1 + +1
¶
− +1 (+1 − +1)
¸

whose first-order condition is

½µ
1− +1+1
¶
(+ +1+1)  (+1) + +1+1 (1−  (+1))
¾
= 0
The above argument shows that the equations determining the firms’ capital structure,
the law of motion of  and the price of liquidated capital  are the same as in Definition
5 of a competitive equilibrium, with no aggregate uncertainty and do not depend on 
In contrast, we see from the new expressions of Equilibrium Conditions 1 (the (interior)
condition for the firms’ optimum in the capital goods sector),


0 (()) = 1 (20)
and 6. (capital market clearing)
+1(+1) = ¯() + 0 (())
that  depends on  and  does too (as well as on the history of realizations of ), and so .
The same argument as the one in the paper for the case of no aggregate risk then implies
that  increases in response to a (marginal) increases of  above its equilibrium value. Hence
from (20) we see that () also increases, for every . An extension of the argument in the
main text then allows to show that agents’ welfare also increases, as a result.
5 The corporate income tax
The presence of fire sales and stochastic depreciation makes it diﬃcult to incorporate a
realistic version of the corporate income tax in our baseline model. In the main text we
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chose then to use a tax on the value of equity as a proxy for the corporate income tax.
In this section, we investigate in more detail the relationship between taxes on corporate
earnings (after interest and depreciation) and taxes on the value of equity. To keep things
simple, we focus on the steady state and assume that the depreciation rate is non-stochastic,
given by a constant 1−  Hence there are no fire sales,  = .
Suppose a firm has one unit of capital at the end of date 0. One unit of capital produces
 units of the good. The depreciation in period 1 is (1− ) . In the steady state, the
interest rate  satisfies 1 (1 + ) =  or  = (1− ) . If  is the face value of the debt
issued, the amount borrowed is  and the interest on the debt is
 = 1−   = (1− ) 
Since capital is constant (depreciation is replaced by new investment), the firm’s earnings
are constant over time and equal to
 = − (1− )  − (1− ) 
at each date . With a proportional tax  on corporate earnings, the tax paid at date  is
 and the present value of future taxes, at the end of date 1, is

∞X
=1
 = 
∞X
=1
 (− (1− )  − (1− ) )
=  
1−  (−  (1− )− (1− ))
Let  denote the value of equity at the end of a period (i.e., in sub-period ). This
clearly satisfies
 = (1− ) 
1−  (−  (1− )− (1− ))
If instead a tax is imposed on the value of equity at the rate  0 each period, the tax bill
in period  is  0ˆ , where ˆ denotes the value of equity in this case, and earnings after tax
are
ˆ = − (1− )  − (1− )  −  0ˆ 
Then ˆ satisfies
ˆ =
∞X
=1
 (− (1− )  − (1− ) −  0ˆ)
=

1−  (− (1− )  − (1− ) − 
0ˆ)
and so
ˆ = 
1−  +  0 (− (1− )  − (1− ) ) 
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Then it is clear that  = ˆ if and only if
1− 
1−  =
1
1−  +  0
or
 = 
0
1−  +  0 
When this condition is satisfied, it seems intuitively clear and can be shown by direct calcu-
lations that the present value of taxes is the same under each tax regime.
6 Long-term debt and debt covenants
In the main text we considered the case where all debt takes the form of bonds with a
maturity of one period. Thus, all debt is due for repayment one period after it is issued. If
instead debt took the form of bonds with a maturity of   1 periods, then in a steady state,
one -th of the debt would be due for repayment each period. The face value of debt issued
in equilibrium might be greater if the maturity were  periods rather than one, but, other
things being equal, increasing the maturity of the debt tends to reduce the amount that had
to be repaid in any one period. Thus, one might expect that, other things being equal, the
probability of default and the severity of fire sales would be less if firms issued bonds with
longer maturities.
In this case however, the ceteris paribus assumption is not particularly plausible. If
the severity of fire sales decreases, firms will have an incentive to increase the face value
of debt they issue. But there is a more serious problem with long term debt. It creates a
moral hazard for creditors. Creditors have little control over the firm as long as the debt
contract only requires it to pay the agreed interest and principal. This allows equity holders
to enrich themselves at the expense of creditors. Consider the extreme case of perpetual
bonds that pay interest at the rate  = 1−  on principal of  per unit of capital. As long as
the firm pays the required interest each period, there is nothing to stop the equity holders
from paying themselves large dividends by selling oﬀ capital until the firm is worthless. It is
because of this possibility that long-term bond contracts typically contain multiple covenants
controlling the behavior of the firm. For example, covenants might restrict the firm’s ability
to issue new debt and to alter the seniority of the existing debt. They might also require the
firm to maintain an adequate ratio of earnings to interest payments, the so-called interest
coverage ratio, and to maintain the value of the firm’s assets in relation to the value of debt.
If any of these covenants is violated, the firm is technically in default and the repayment of
the debt is accelerated, i.e., repayment of the entire debt is due immediately. Such technical
defaults rarely result in the bankruptcy of the firm (Roberts and Sufi, 2009). Rather, they
force a renegotiation in which the firm may be forced to pay a higher interest rate, put up
more collateral, or make some other change in its behavior or commitments.
One plausible covenant in our model would require the firm not only to make regular
interest payments but also to maintain the level of the firm’s assets. This will prevent the
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firm from selling oﬀ assets and paying the proceeds to equity holders. In the case of a firm
with one unit of capital and a depreciation rate 1 − , the firm will have to pay 1 −  in
interest and invest (1− )  to replace the depreciated capital stock. Since the firm’s gross
revenue is , the firm will only be able to satisfy the covenants if −(1− ) −(1− )  ≥ 0.
Note that the covenant is specified assuming that the firm can buy ‘used’ capital goods at
the lower price of . If the inequality is not satisfied, the firm is technically in default and
will be forced to renegotiate with the creditors. Let ∗∗ denote the value of  at which the
firm is just able to satisfy the covenants. That is,
− (1− ∗∗)  − (1− )  = 0
We assume that, if the firm is forced to renegotiate, it makes a take-it-or-leave-it oﬀer that
is accepted or rejected by the creditors subject to the rules that we laid down in the model
considered in the main text. There we found that renegotiation succeeds if and only if  ≥ ∗,
where
− ∗ = 
If ∗∗  ∗, then renegotiation occurs and fails if and only if   ∗, just as in the model
with one-period debt. In that case, even though the debt consists of perpetual bonds, the
principal of which is never repaid, default occurs precisely as it does with one-period debt.
In this case, there would exist an equilibrium that is essentially the same as the equilibrium
in the baseline model. On the other hand, if ∗  ∗∗, then renegotiation does not occur for
some values of  where it would fail. In other words, the probability of default will be strictly
lower than it would be in the model with one-period debt, other things being equal. Other
things may not be equal, however. In the first place, the firm has an incentive to increase
the face of debt issued, because it does not have to renegotiate in the states ∗    ∗∗,
where default would occur with one-period bonds. An increase in the face value of debt will
lead to changes in equilibrium prices, however, and that will lead to further changes in the
capital structure. The final eﬀect of the switch to longer maturity debt is not clear.
Whichever case, ∗  ∗∗ or ∗  ∗∗, occurs in equilibrium, it is clear that  =
min {∗ ∗∗} plays the role of the breakeven level in the model with one-period debt. Even
in the extreme case of perpetual bonds, with no requirement to repay principal, the qual-
itative behavior of the model will be similar to the model considered in the main text
with one-period debt. Firms will be forced to renegotiate and will be forced to liquidate if
   = min {∗ ∗∗}. Long-term debt with this bond covenant functions essentially like
short-term debt as far as default is concerned.
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will not necessarily achieve a welfare improvement. Increasing ∗ will increase the value of
capital ∗ and investment and the capital stock will increase as a result; but an increase in
∗ will also increase the deadweight costs of bankruptcy. Which eﬀect dominates depends
on the elasticity of investment with respect to ∗ and hence ∗. If  is suﬃciently small, the
response of investment will be large enough that the benefits of an increase in ∗ outweigh
the costs. Otherwise, the costs outweigh the benefits.
In the original model, with  = 0, a change in ∗ has no direct eﬀect on welfare. The
costs of debt and equity as perceived by firms, that is the costs of fire sales in the case of debt
and taxes in the case of equity, are not true economic costs. Consequently, a change in ∗
has no direct implication for the level of output and the resources available for consumption.
The only thing that matters is that the induced fall in the taxes paid increases the value
of capital and stimulates investment, thus oﬀsetting the underinvestment that results from
the ‘tax’ on capital. It does not matter how small the increase in investment is. Any
increase in investment will increase welfare. When there are deadweight costs of default,
increasing ∗ has both costs and benefits and the relative size of the two eﬀects is critical to
the determination of the change in welfare.
Example Let  = 1,  = 09,  = 03,  = 01,  v  [0 1], and
 () = 1
1− 
1−
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Then  can be defined by the market-clearing condition
∗ =  (1−  ())R ∗
0

=
1− ∗
05 (∗)2
and the steady-state value of ∗ is given by
∗ = 
½
 (1−  (∗)) + ∗¯ − ∗
Z 1
∗
( − ∗) 
¾
=
 (1−  (∗))
1− 
³
¯ −  R 1∗ ( − ∗) ´
=
(09) (1− (01) ∗)
1− (09) ¡05− (03) (05) (1− ∗)2¢
=
09− 009∗
0135(∗)2 − 027∗ + 0685 
Finally, ∗ is determined by the first-order condition
½µ
1
∗ −
1− 
∗
¶
+
µ
1
∗ −
1
∗
¶
∗∗
¾  (∗)
1−  (∗) = 
or
½µ
1
∗ −
09
∗
¶
+
µ
1
∗ −
1
∗
¶
∗∗
¾
1
1− ∗ = 03
Substituting for the values for ∗ and ∗ from the equations above, we obtain
µµ
052
1−  −
01352 − 027 + 0685
09− 009
¶
+
µ
052
1−  −
01352 − 027 + 0685
09− 009
¶
1− 
05
¶
1
1−  = 03
The solution is  = 06818. Substituting into the equations for  and  yields
 = 1− 06818
05 (06818)2
= 1369
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and
 = 09− 009 (06818)
0135(06818)2 − 027 (06818) + 0685
= 14878
Now, the expression for the change in welfare is
∞X
=0
∆ = − 
1− 
0 (∗) ∗∆
+
(
1
1− 
µ
−1 + (1−  (∗)) 
1− ¯
0 (∗)
¶
−
∞X
=1
¡¯¢ (1−  (∗)) 1
1− ¯
0 (∗)
)
∆
= −(09) (01)
1− 09 
∗∆
+
(
1
1− 09
µ
−1 + (1− (01) (06818)) 2
14878
¶
−
∞X
=1
(045) (1− 01 (06818)) 2
14878
)
∆
= − (09) ∗∆ + (024866)∆
where we have replaced 0 (∗) with 1∗ . The welfare change will be positive if and only if
∆
∆ 
(09) ∗
024866 = 36194
∗
Since 0 () = −,
∗ = (∗) 1
and
∗ =  (
∗)
1− ¯ =
2 (∗) 1−
1−  =
2 (14878) 1−
1−  
26
From the steady state expression for ∗ we calculate
∆∗ = 
½
− 0 (∗)∆∗ + ¯∆∗ − ∆∗
Z 1
∗
( − ∗)  + ∗ (1−  (∗))∆∗
¾
=
− 0 (∗) + ∗ (1−  (∗))
1− 
³
¯ −  R 1∗ ( − ∗) ´ ∆∗
=
−01 + (03) (14878) (1− 06818)
1− (09) ¡(05)− (03) (05) ¡1− (06818)2¢¢∆∗
= 0067538∆∗
Then
∆
∆ =




= (0067538) 1 (14878)
1
−1
= 0045395(14878)
1


Then the condition for a welfare improvement becomes
(0045395) (14878)
1

  36194
∗
= (048476) 2 (14878)
1−

1− 
which is satisfied if and only if 0    0065125.
4 Aggregate uncertainty
To introduce aggregate uncertainty, we assume that the distribution of depreciation rates is
subject to aggregate shocks. Let {} be a series of i.i.d. random variables taking values in
a finite set S with probability density π = {}∈S . After production of the consumption
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good by an arbitrary firm  at date , one unit of capital is reduced to  units of capital,
where  is the usual idiosyncractic shock and  is a common shock. We assume that 
and  are independent for each  and .
In this environment both the stock of capital, consumption, investment and prices will
depend on the aggregate shock. We show in what follows that, again under the assumption
that consumers are risk neutral, that is (1) holds, an equilibrium exists where prices are
inversely related to the realization of the aggregate state, +1 () = +1, +1 () = +1
for any  ∈ S and some +1 +1 while the default threshold is independent of the state,
+1 () = +1, for any .
The market-clearing condition in the liquidation market in sub-period  (Equilibrium
Condition 4) in every state  is then
+1 () =  (1−  (+1))R +1
0
+1 
or, using the above specification,
+1 =  (1−  (+1))R +1
0
+1
The tax base is again the value of the firm’s equity at the beginning of sub-period ,
whenever it is non negative, that is, the diﬀerence between the value of capital owned by the
firm and the value of (renegotiated) debt
+1 ()
µ 
+1 () + +1
¶
− +1 ()
µ +1
+1()
¶

Hence, the corporate income tax payment due at date  + 1 in state , using the definition
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of the default threshold, + +1 () +1 = +1 is
 max
½
+1 ()
µ 
+1 () + +1
¶
− +1 ()
µ +1
+1 ()
¶
 0
¾
=  max
½+1 ()
+1 () (+ +1 () +1 −− +1 () +1)  0
¾
=  max {+1 (+1 − +1)  0} 
The optimal capital structure is then obtained as a solution of the following problem of
maximizing the the firm’s market value at 
max+1
X
∈S
 () 
⎧
⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎩
R +1
0
(+ +1 () +1) +R 1
+1
h
+1 ()
³

+1() + +1
´
− +1 ()  (+1 − +1)
i
⎫
⎪⎪⎬
⎪⎪⎭
 =

Z +1
0
(+ +1+1)  +
Z 1
+1
∙
+1
µ 
+1 + +1
¶
− +1 (+1 − +1)
¸

whose first-order condition is

½µ
1− +1+1
¶
(+ +1+1)  (+1) + +1+1 (1−  (+1))
¾
= 0
The above argument shows that the equations determining the firms’ capital structure,
the law of motion of  and the price of liquidated capital  are the same as in Definition
5 of a competitive equilibrium, with no aggregate uncertainty and do not depend on 
In contrast, we see from the new expressions of Equilibrium Conditions 1 (the (interior)
condition for the firms’ optimum in the capital goods sector),


0 (()) = 1 (20)
and 6. (capital market clearing)
+1(+1) = ¯() + 0 (())
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that  depends on  and  does too (as well as on the history of realizations of ), and so .
The same argument as the one in the paper for the case of no aggregate risk then implies
that  increases in response to a (marginal) increases of  above its equilibrium value. Hence
from (20) we see that () also increases, for every . An extension of the argument in the
main text then allows to show that agents’ welfare also increases, as a result.
5 The corporate income tax
The presence of fire sales and stochastic depreciation makes it diﬃcult to incorporate a
realistic version of the corporate income tax in our baseline model. In the main text we
chose then to use a tax on the value of equity as a proxy for the corporate income tax.
In this section, we investigate in more detail the relationship between taxes on corporate
earnings (after interest and depreciation) and taxes on the value of equity. To keep things
simple, we focus on the steady state and assume that the depreciation rate is non-stochastic,
given by a constant 1−  Hence there are no fire sales,  = .
Suppose a firm has one unit of capital at the end of date 0. One unit of capital produces
 units of the good. The depreciation in period 1 is (1− ) . In the steady state, the
interest rate  satisfies 1 (1 + ) =  or  = (1− ) . If  is the face value of the debt
issued, the amount borrowed is  and the interest on the debt is
 = 1−   = (1− ) 
Since capital is constant (depreciation is replaced by new investment), the firm’s earnings
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are constant over time and equal to
 = − (1− )  − (1− ) 
at each date . With a proportional tax  on corporate earnings, the tax paid at date  is
 and the present value of future taxes, at the end of date 1, is

∞X
=1
 = 
∞X
=1
 (− (1− )  − (1− ) )
=  
1−  (−  (1− )− (1− ))
Let  denote the value of equity at the end of a period (i.e., in sub-period ). This
clearly satisfies
 = (1− ) 
1−  (−  (1− )− (1− ))
If instead a tax is imposed on the value of equity at the rate  0 each period, the tax bill
in period  is  0ˆ , where ˆ denotes the value of equity in this case, and earnings after tax
are
ˆ = − (1− )  − (1− )  −  0ˆ 
Then ˆ satisfies
ˆ =
∞X
=1
 (− (1− )  − (1− ) −  0ˆ)
=

1−  (− (1− )  − (1− ) − 
0ˆ)
and so
ˆ = 
1−  +  0 (− (1− )  − (1− ) ) 
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Then it is clear that  = ˆ if and only if
1− 
1−  =
1
1−  +  0
or
 = 
0
1−  +  0 
When this condition is satisfied, it seems intuitively clear and can be shown by direct calcu-
lations that the present value of taxes is the same under each tax regime.
6 Long-term debt and debt covenants
In the main text we considered the case where all debt takes the form of bonds with a
maturity of one period. Thus, all debt is due for repayment one period after it is issued. If
instead debt took the form of bonds with a maturity of   1 periods, then in a steady state,
one -th of the debt would be due for repayment each period. The face value of debt issued
in equilibrium might be greater if the maturity were  periods rather than one, but, other
things being equal, increasing the maturity of the debt tends to reduce the amount that had
to be repaid in any one period. Thus, one might expect that, other things being equal, the
probability of default and the severity of fire sales would be less if firms issued bonds with
longer maturities.
In this case however, the ceteris paribus assumption is not particularly plausible. If
the severity of fire sales decreases, firms will have an incentive to increase the face value
of debt they issue. But there is a more serious problem with long term debt. It creates a
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moral hazard for creditors. Creditors have little control over the firm as long as the debt
contract only requires it to pay the agreed interest and principal. This allows equity holders
to enrich themselves at the expense of creditors. Consider the extreme case of perpetual
bonds that pay interest at the rate  = 1−  on principal of  per unit of capital. As long as
the firm pays the required interest each period, there is nothing to stop the equity holders
from paying themselves large dividends by selling oﬀ capital until the firm is worthless. It is
because of this possibility that long-term bond contracts typically contain multiple covenants
controlling the behavior of the firm. For example, covenants might restrict the firm’s ability
to issue new debt and to alter the seniority of the existing debt. They might also require the
firm to maintain an adequate ratio of earnings to interest payments, the so-called interest
coverage ratio, and to maintain the value of the firm’s assets in relation to the value of debt.
If any of these covenants is violated, the firm is technically in default and the repayment of
the debt is accelerated, i.e., repayment of the entire debt is due immediately. Such technical
defaults rarely result in the bankruptcy of the firm (Roberts and Sufi, 2009). Rather, they
force a renegotiation in which the firm may be forced to pay a higher interest rate, put up
more collateral, or make some other change in its behavior or commitments.
One plausible covenant in our model would require the firm not only to make regular
interest payments but also to maintain the level of the firm’s assets. This will prevent the
firm from selling oﬀ assets and paying the proceeds to equity holders. In the case of a firm
with one unit of capital and a depreciation rate 1 − , the firm will have to pay 1 −  in
interest and invest (1− )  to replace the depreciated capital stock. Since the firm’s gross
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revenue is , the firm will only be able to satisfy the covenants if −(1− ) −(1− )  ≥ 0.
Note that the covenant is specified assuming that the firm can buy ‘used’ capital goods at
the lower price of . If the inequality is not satisfied, the firm is technically in default and
will be forced to renegotiate with the creditors. Let ∗∗ denote the value of  at which the
firm is just able to satisfy the covenants. That is,
− (1− ∗∗)  − (1− )  = 0
We assume that, if the firm is forced to renegotiate, it makes a take-it-or-leave-it oﬀer that
is accepted or rejected by the creditors subject to the rules that we laid down in the model
considered in the main text. There we found that renegotiation succeeds if and only if  ≥ ∗,
where
− ∗ = 
If ∗∗  ∗, then renegotiation occurs and fails if and only if   ∗, just as in the model
with one-period debt. In that case, even though the debt consists of perpetual bonds, the
principal of which is never repaid, default occurs precisely as it does with one-period debt.
In this case, there would exist an equilibrium that is essentially the same as the equilibrium
in the baseline model. On the other hand, if ∗  ∗∗, then renegotiation does not occur for
some values of  where it would fail. In other words, the probability of default will be strictly
lower than it would be in the model with one-period debt, other things being equal. Other
things may not be equal, however. In the first place, the firm has an incentive to increase
the face of debt issued, because it does not have to renegotiate in the states ∗    ∗∗,
where default would occur with one-period bonds. An increase in the face value of debt will
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lead to changes in equilibrium prices, however, and that will lead to further changes in the
capital structure. The final eﬀect of the switch to longer maturity debt is not clear.
Whichever case, ∗  ∗∗ or ∗  ∗∗, occurs in equilibrium, it is clear that  =
min {∗ ∗∗} plays the role of the breakeven level in the model with one-period debt. Even
in the extreme case of perpetual bonds, with no requirement to repay principal, the qual-
itative behavior of the model will be similar to the model considered in the main text
with one-period debt. Firms will be forced to renegotiate and will be forced to liquidate if
   = min {∗ ∗∗}. Long-term debt with this bond covenant functions essentially like
short-term debt as far as default is concerned.
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